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Abstract. During the height of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, 
the government bailed out numerous corporations, including banks, 
investment banks, and automobile manufacturers. While the bailouts 
helped end the financial crisis, they were intensely controversial at the 
time, and were marred by the ad hoc, politicized quality of the 
government intervention. We examine the bailouts from the financial 
crisis as well as earlier bailouts to determine what policy 
considerations best justify them, and how they are best designed. The 
major considerations in bailing out and structuring the bailout of a 
firm are the macroeconomic impact of failure; the moral hazard effect 
of the bailout; the discriminatory effect of the bailout; and procedural 
fairness. Future bailouts should be guided by principles that ensure 
that the decisionmaker properly takes into account these factors. 
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disclose that one of us (Posner) has done work in that litigation for the plaintiff. He is grateful to the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the word “bailout” has become a term of abuse 
in our political lexicon. The bailouts of numerous financial institutions and two 
automobile manufacturers were extremely controversial.2 Congress sought in the 
Dodd-Frank Act to ensure that bailouts would never take place again, going so far 
as to write into the preamble that one purpose of the Act was to “to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”3 President Barack Obama agreed that 
“because of this law, the American people will never again be asked to foot the bill 
for Wall Street’s mistakes.”4 But after his former Treasury secretary admitted that 
Dodd-Frank would not end bailouts, Republicans in the House of Representatives 
issued a scathing report entitled “Failing to End ‘Too Big to Fail’: An Assessment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act Four Years Later.”5 The political unpopularity of bailouts is 
matched in the academic literature, where the traditional view is that bailouts are 
almost always unwise, and usually result from political failure.6 
But the word “bailout” is used in different ways, and it is sometimes hard to get 
clear what people are complaining about. A bailout is, essentially, a transfer of 
money or other resources from the government to a private agent (or sometimes to 
another government). Such transfers occur every day and hardly ever cause anyone 
to lift an eyebrow. The government transfers money or other valuable consideration 
to solar panel manufacturers, dairy farmers, poor people, and research universities. 
While many people disagree about the wisdom of these transfers, they do not regard 
them as illegitimate in the same way that they often regard bailouts. 
We can make some progress by observing that in common parlance the word 
bailout refers to a subset of transfers where the transfer is intended to rescue an 
agent who cannot meet its financial obligations. Even here, however, the source of 
complaint is obscure. If the government is willing to subsidize a manufacturer of 
solar power panels by giving it money, making loans to it, or guaranteeing its debt 
(as it often is), then what’s wrong with a policy of paying off an unpaid debt if 
                                                
2 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Constituents Make Their Bailout Views Known, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at 
A27 (“Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, has received nearly 17,000 e-mail messages, 
nearly all opposed to the bailout, her office said.”). 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
4 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1087, 1089 (July 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-
reform-and-consumer-protection-act.  
5 REP. STAFF OF COMM. ON FIN. SERV., U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 113TH CONG., FAILING TO END ‘TOO BIG TO 
FAIL’: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS LATER, (July 2014), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf.  
6 See infra Part I. 
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otherwise it would default? The effect of all these policies is the same: to lower the 
cost of capital for the beneficiary. The policy justification is also the same: to 
encourage people to invest in solar power. 
Indeed, the government routinely helps agents who are about to default on 
debts. The FDIC, for example, insures people against loss of their deposits up to 
$250,000.7 If a bank fails, the FDIC transfers money to depositors, in this way 
paying the bank’s debts (or some of them) for it. Similarly, if a natural disaster 
strikes, the government frequently assists victims by supplying them with loan 
guarantees and other benefits that make it easier for them to pay off their debts 
while they are rebuilding their lives.8 
FDIC payments are not called “bailouts”; why not? One reason is that the 
payouts are part of a regulatory program that puts burdens on banks and 
depositors. Banks must pay for FDIC insurance, and they must submit to 
regulations that are designed to prevent them from taking excessive risks. These 
costs are passed on to depositors in the form of interest rates on checking accounts 
that are lower than they would otherwise be. Thus, the FDIC payouts seem no more 
objectionable than payouts made by a private insurance company. In both cases, the 
insured party pays for the insurance, so when insurance payouts are made, they do 
not seem undeserved. 
Similarly, banks often receive cheap loans from the Fed that help them through 
spells of illiquidity. These discount window loans, as they are called, do not offend 
public values because the banks can receive them only if they are members of the 
Federal Reserve System, which requires them to purchase capital in federal reserve 
banks and submit to regulations. Banks must also pay for the loans in the form of 
interest. 
Any reasonable definition of bailouts will need to encompass “good” (or at least, 
uncontroversial) bailouts as well as “bad” bailouts. We are comfortable with the 
following definition. A bailout occurs when the government makes payments 
(including loans, loan guarantees, cash, and other types of consideration) to a 
liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable that agent to pay its creditors 
and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled to those payments under a 
statutory scheme. As we will see, this definition of bailout admits for some fuzzy 
cases, but it will serve. 
                                                
7 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (2012). 
8 See, e.g.,15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012) (authorizing the Small Business Administration to offer loans 
and other financial assistance to businesses and private citizens after a disaster). There are many 
such programs. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-195 ENR, A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF 
FEDERAL RELIEF, INSURANCE, AND LOSS REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR NATURAL HAZARDS (1992); Barry 
J. Barnett, US Government Natural Disaster Assistance: Historical Analysis and a Proposal for the 
Future, 23 DISASTERS 139 (1999). 
5 
 
The key feature of the bailout—and the feature that makes people so 
uncomfortable—is that it is ex post. People who operate in the private market are 
expected to be responsible for their debts when they have not paid for guarantees or 
insurance. Everyone expects them to take precautions to ensure that they can pay 
their debt, or not to take on the debt in the first place. 
It is for this reason that many people believe that bailouts violate the rule of law 
or offend other norms of our constitutional system.9 Bailout recipients have no 
entitlement to a bailout yet they receive one anyway. Moreover, the prospect of a 
bailout may encourage firms to engage in risky behavior. Often bailouts occur 
during emergencies, and it is thought that the beneficiary takes advantage of the 
press of time to push through the bailout plan. That is why Congress sought to end 
bailouts once and for all in Dodd-Frank. 
Yet, as we will argue, governments should not try to legislate away bailouts. 
Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot anticipate the contingencies 
that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that regulates behavior and 
charges firms in advance for liquidity support or other transfers. The question then 
arises whether bailouts can nonetheless be regulated in advance so that the worst 
types of bailouts are avoided and only good bailouts are implemented. In short, can 
we develop some rules or principles that govern how the government uses bailouts 
when, by hypothesis, we cannot legislate the specific conditions under which they 
must or must not be used? 
The answer is—yes. Congress frequently regulates the way that the government 
(including itself, but mainly the president and regulatory agencies) addresses some 
problem while nonetheless allowing it the discretion to determine whether to 
address the problem in the first place. A humdrum example comes from law 
enforcement. Law enforcement officials enjoy enormous discretion whether to 
respond to a call for help, investigate a crime, file charges, and prosecute. But they 
face numerous constraints on how they pursue actions once they decide to take 
them. A police officer can refrain from helping someone pursue a bike thief, but if 
the officer chooses to help, he cannot make searches without a warrant. A 
                                                
9 See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The Role of Policy in the Great Recession and the Weak Recovery, 104 
AMER. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., 61, 62-63 (2014) (noting that “ad hoc bailout policy” trampled 
existing law); Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 
58 (2009) (describing TARP as “a constitutional monstrosity”); Lawrence H. White, The Rule of Law 
or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO J. 451 (2010) (arguing that government officials in the crisis 
“consider[ed] every possible remedy but applying the rule of law”); Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and The 
Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., (May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124217356836613091 
(arguing that the 2009 Chrysler bailout violates the rule of law principle); Timothy A. Canova, 
Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New 
Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369, 392 (2009) (describing the Federal 
Reserves’ actions during the crisis as extreme violations of the rule of law and “flagrant” 
constitutional violations).  
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prosecutor can decline to prosecute, but if she prosecutes, she cannot do so in a way 
that violates the code of ethics. 
Moreover, the law already provides a basis for challenging bailouts, albeit a 
weak and confusing one. Bailouts are “givings” rather than “takings,” and thus not 
directly addressed by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.10 There is no law that 
permits people to compel the government to bail them out. Yet both statutory and 
constitutional law provides some constraints on bailouts. The Fed—the major 
bailout agency—is governed by a statute that limits who it can bail out, and the 
terms of bailouts. The Bankruptcy Code puts constraints on bailouts when they 
take place in bankruptcy. And both the Takings Clause and the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine may come into play if the government conditions a bailout on 
waiver of constitutional rights.11 
These bodies of law have played a role in significant litigation that has emerged 
from the financial crisis. In 2013, shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
sued the government on the ground that the federal rescue expropriated their 
property by eliminating their right to the firms’ profits. In 2011, automobile dealers 
brought a lawsuit against the government that argued that during the bailout the 
government compelled the auto makers to terminate contracts with them. Also in 
2011, shareholders of the vast insurance company AIG sued the government for 
diluting their equity when it made emergency loans to AIG. All of the lawsuits 
argued that the government violated the Takings clause, and in each case a court 
was willing to entertain the argument if the plaintiffs could prove the factual 
predicates of their claims.12 
Thus, one cannot avoid thinking about the optimal regulation of bailouts—if only 
to understand and criticize existing law. At the same time, the regulation of 
bailouts poses some special problems. The source of a bailout is often Congress 
itself, and so Congress may choose to disregard earlier legislation that seeks to 
constrain it. Even when a bailout comes from the Fed or another agency, Congress 
might be reluctant to impose constraints on it just because bailouts are by definition 
pursued in extraordinary, hard-to-anticipate situations, unlike regular law 
enforcement. For this reason, we will propose bailout “principles” without taking a 
position on whether they can be embodied in a statute. Perhaps they can; but if they 
can’t, we will argue that stated principles, even if not legally enforceable, may be a 
useful way to structure the political response to bailouts. 
                                                
10 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L. J. 547 (2011) (observing that 
givings pose the same constitutional problems that takings do). 
11 The question of whether the government exceeded these constraints during the financial crisis 
bailouts is the subject of various ongoing lawsuits. See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 
100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014). 
12 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
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In Part I, we provide a brief review of the legal literature on bailouts. In Part II, 
we discuss the idea of a bailout, and explain why it is useful to identify it as a 
residual category of transfers that the government makes when existing law “runs 
out.” In Part III, we draw some lessons from notable bailouts—from the financial 
crisis, and before. Criticism of them can be divided into four categories: they were 
not socially desirable from an ex post perspective; they were unfair (they treated 
like people or firms unalike); they produced moral hazard and other bad incentives 
for people who expect more bailouts in the future; and they did not obey principles 
of procedural due process. These lessons motivate our proposed Bailout Principles, 
which we discuss in Part IV. The Bailout Principles describe rules that maximize 
the likelihood that bailouts will serve the public interest. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Before the financial crisis, the legal literature on bailouts was sparse. A single 
article, written by Professor Cheryl Block, offered a framework for thinking about 
certain bailouts.13 Block points out that bailouts are ex post government 
interventions that may produce perverse incentives, but she defines bailouts more 
broadly than we do to encompass insurance payouts made pursuant to ex ante 
insurance schemes.14 So while Block ends up discussing how such insurance 
schemes should be designed,15 we focus on payouts that are made in the absence of 
such schemes.  
The post-financial crisis literature on bailouts is vast. Most of the scholarship 
describes and evaluates specific bailouts,16 and does not attempt to provide 
principles of bailout regulation, as we do. Many scholars have also written about the 
implications of the financial crisis for financial regulation, bankruptcy law and 
other insolvency regimes.17 
                                                
13 Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951, 
956-58 (1992). 
14 Id. at 972-976 (discussing “prospective bailout” regimes). 
15 Id. at 1033-34. 
16 See generally Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 727 (2010); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the 
Financial Crisis Aftermath, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Adam B. Badawi & Anthony J. Casey, 
The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate Lens, 1 N.Y.U. J. BUS. L. 443 (2014); see 
also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN L. REV. 463 (2009) (providing a descriptive examination of some of the 
government reactions to the financial crisis). 
17 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010); 
Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of 
Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449 (2009); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis 
Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Steven L. Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 
(2009); see also Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When 
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A few scholars have begun exploring how bailouts should be regulated.18 
Professor Adam Levitin argues that a bailout system should have “political 
accountability as the paramount institutional design goal”—by which he means that 
a bailout should please the median voter—and offers some design principles for 
ensuring that bailouts will be politically legitimate.19 By contrast, we argue that 
bailouts should serve public policy (should be “efficient,” in a broad sense); we 
assume that they will be politically legitimate if they are consistent with principles 
that tend to ensure efficiency or good public policy. Indeed, when the government 
enacts bad policy in response to short-term public demand, its legitimacy can be 
hurt in the long run. This is especially true where, as in the case of bailouts, 
popular preferences tend to exhibit significant temporal inconsistency.20  
Professor Jeffrey Manns proposes to subject bailouts to a set of limitations.21 He 
identifies three principles behind these limitations: (1) deterring moral hazard; (2) 
recouping the government’s investment; and (3) linking bailouts to governance 
reform.22 These principles lead him to propose an investment fund – the Federal 
Government Investment Corporation (FGIC) – with the limited power to make 
                                                                                                                                                       
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131 (2009) (discussing the implication of the crisis 
and bailouts on theories of political corruption). An enormous amount has been written on the 
regulation and resolution of financial institutions specifically. Much of this literature is focused more 
on assessing the Dodd-Frank Act and ex ante regulations to prevent the systemic spread of the 
failure of financial institution. It is difficult, however, to separate this literature from bailout 
literature more broadly as the two issues are so deeply intertwined after the financial crisis. See, e.g., 
Thomas H. Jackon & David A. Skeel Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions, 2 Harv. 
BUS. L. REV. 435 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); John Armour & Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. L. ANALYSIS 35 (2014); Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a 
Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151 (2011); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher 
Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management 
(Columbia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 369, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553880; Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 293 (2012).  
18 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building 
Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349 (2011); Iman 
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of 
Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 75 (2013); see also Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder 
Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409 (2012) (proposing an elective shareholder liability mechanism to 
reduce moral hazard and windfall problems inherent in the operation bailouts of financial 
institutions). 
19 Levitin, supra note 18, at 506. 
20 See infra II.E.4. 
21 Manns, supra note 18, at 1383-84. 
22 Id. at 1388. 
9 
 
bailout funds available under certain conditions.23 The FGIC would have authority 
to invest in systemically significant firms where it could certify that default raises 
systemic risk.24 Even with those thresholds met, the FGIC would be limited in 
implementing the bailout. The fund would be permitted to invest no more than 50% 
of the equity value of any bailout recipient for a limited period of time.25 Creditors 
would be required to take a haircut, and the bailout recipient would be required to 
undergo corporate governance reforms.26 
But the second and third principles are not proper goals of a bailout system.27 
While the performance of a government investment is one relevant measure of ex 
post efficiency, it is not an end in itself. A bailout that prevents social losses of $100 
billion at a cost of $5 billion for the government is a socially beneficial bailout. And 
while corporate governance reform is a valid goal, a bailout is not a good time to 
implement it. The government’s role as a bailout monopolist gives it leverage over 
recipients, which lends itself to abuse. Moreover, because bailout decisions must 
typically be made with great rapidity, officials do not have the time to evaluate a 
firm’s governance structure and propose reforms. 
Professors Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarz argue that bailouts are part of a 
necessary ex post system of financial regulation.28 In an analysis of the broader 
question of financial regulation, they suggest that financial risk must be regulated 
both through ex ante and ex post measures.29 Among the necessary ex post 
measures, they include bailouts or “safety nets.” They suggest that the power to 
provide safety nets should be institutionalized in a standing government agency 
with the power to invest in firms that are too big to fail.30 They identify some costs 
                                                
23 Id. at 1383-84. 
24 Id. at 1396. 
25 Under this rule, the government has to take a share of convertible equity in the firm that is 
proportional to the amount it invests. And that share is limited to 50% of the firm’s equity value. Id. 
at 1386-87. 
26 Id. at 1388-89, 1391-92. 
27 Manns’s first principle – deterring moral hazard – is one on which we agree. But Manns 
overweights this principle’s importance. He identifies moral hazard concerns as the “key” to 
designing bailouts. Id. at 1388. We suggest below that moral hazard can be a concern in some but 
not all cases. A narrow focus on moral hazard can obscure the other principles of fairness, efficiency, 
and process that we identify. Similarly we agree with Manns that there are risks to ex post 
discretion, see id. at 1404, but his attempts to prevent this through strict ex ante formulas for 
investment removes the value of bailouts and relegates government power to those cases where 
bailouts are by definition unnecessary.  
28 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 102–12. 
29 Id. at 130. 
30 Id. at 106. They argue that an existing authority, rather than an ad hoc response to crisis, will 
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inherent in these safety nets – namely moral hazard and false positives. Beyond 
noting some of the ways that moral hazard can be reduced,31 they do not, however, 
provide guidelines for the exercise of the bailout power.32  
There is also a large economic literature on bailouts of financial firms during 
liquidity crises.33 Most economists believe that the central bank should make 
secured loans to illiquid but solvent financial institutions during a liquidity crisis.34 
When a bailout produces positive externalities (typically in the form of restoring 
liquidity to the market) that exceed moral hazard costs, it is socially beneficial.35 
Many economists and central bankers believe that relatively clear rules are needed 
to govern bailouts in order to constrain central banks and ensure that they 
maintain legitimacy in a democratic system.36 
Our article builds on this literature, but we try to derive a more detailed set of 
principles for regulating bailouts, based on our interpretation of the successes and 
problems with numerous bailouts that have taken place since 1970. We draw on 
some of the insights in the economic literature, but our approach is both more 
general—we look at all bailouts, not just financial bailouts—and more specific—we 
propose rules for governing bailouts that are attentive to legal norms and 
institutional structure. 
                                                                                                                                                       
“permit [safety net] design to be developed with the benefit of careful analysis” and “provide a source 
of preexisting authority, as well as political legitimacy, to market liquidity providers.” Id. at 112.  
31 They identify haircuts and “a credible policy of constructive ambiguity” as measures to reduce 
moral hazard. Id. at 124. 
32 Their primary focus is on showing the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post regulation rather than 
providing a prescriptive guide for implementing the various forms of ex post regulation. Id. at 110-
11. 
33 See, e.g., THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT (Forrest H. Capie & Geoffrey E. Wood, eds. 2007); 
FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A READER (Charles Goodhart & 
Gerhard Illing, eds. 2002); FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES (Stijn 
Claessens et al., eds. 2013); Stanley Fischer, On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort, 
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999).  
34 J. Bradford DeLong, This Time, It is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Financial 
Macroeconomics, (Apr. 2012), http://delong.typepad.com/20120411-russell-sage-delong-paper.pdf. 
35 Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley, & Ivo Welch, A Model of Optimal Government Bailouts, (2011), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8wv4p90c.  
36 See Paul Tucker, Independent Agencies In Democracies: Legitimacy and Boundaries for the New 
Central Banks (2014) (unpublished manuscript). 
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II. WHAT IS A BAILOUT? 
A. Definition 
We define a “bailout” as an ex post government transfer (a loan, cash, or other 
consideration) to an agent or group of agents to provide capital that is otherwise 
unavailable because of liquidity constraints. In most cases, this will take the form of 
a transfer to prevent the agent from defaulting on debt, but that is not a technical 
necessity. 
1. Liquidity Constraints 
We stipulate that the bailout recipient faces liquidity problems in order to 
distinguish a bailout from a regular transfer. Consider a firm that makes widgets 
and finances its operations with debt. A cyclical downturn has imposed a cash-flow 
shock on the firm. Although the firm remains economically viable, it cannot pay its 
debts. In a perfectly functioning capital market, the firm would refinance its debts 
and continue operation without a bailout.37 Any government transfer under these 
conditions would be a subsidy. 
Now assume that there is a simultaneous liquidity shock to the financial 
markets that makes it impossible for the firm to raise the funds necessary to 
continue. This is the most straightforward case for a bailout. The government 
provides the liquidity to prevent an economically viable firm from collapsing. 
Still, a firm may in some cases be unable to raise capital even without defaulting 
on prior debt. Our widget company may have had an all equity capital structure. 
That does not change the fact that when the cyclical downturn hits, it needs to raise 
funds for future operations. Again, where capital is unavailable, the government’s 
role as liquidity provider is implicated and a transfer made in that role would be a 
bailout. 
In contrast, a firm may be failing economically regardless of capital markets. 
People may simply not want to buy widgets anymore at a price that makes 
production worthwhile. Any government transfer to the firm in that situation is a 
mere subsidy.38   
                                                
37 To the extent there is a debt overhang problem, bankruptcy without a government bailout could 
still facilitate the refinancing. David A. Skeel, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 687 
(2012). 
38 We will see below that critics of the auto bailout claimed that they were, in fact, subsidies of this 
kind. The government took the contrary position. Our view is that intent matters. A transfer to a 
firm everyone knows is economically failed is not a bailout. A bailout to a firm that is thought by the 
government to be viable but turns out to be failed, is a misguided or bad bailout. As the auto bailouts 
highlight, actual intent can be difficult to discover. This argues in favor of some of the guiding 
principles to minimize abuse of discretion that we advocate below. 
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Complications pile up when we consider the possibility of indirect bailouts. A 
financially troubled widget firm may have numerous stakeholders—employees, 
creditors, and others—who will be badly hurt if the firm collapses. The failure of the 
firm may cause a financial shock to the employees or counterparties. Again, the 
problem exists only where an imperfection in capital markets prevents 
counterparties from obtaining credit. A laid-off employee may not be able to finance 
her retraining; a counterparty on a major contract or a creditor may not be able to 
raise enough capital to survive the cash-flow shock from the widget firm’s failure. In 
these cases, the government may want to bail out the employees or counterparties 
but it may determine that the most cost-effective way to do this is to inject capital 
into the widget firm. This is (or could be, depending on how the bailout is 
structured) a wealth transfer or subsidy to the widget firm, but it is also an indirect 
bailout to the employees or counterparties.39 
This final example reveals two important points. First, all bailouts are 
ultimately about liquidity. The government either bails out economically viable 
liquidity-constrained firms or it indirectly bails out the liquidity-constrained 
stakeholders in a firm (when the firm may be insolvent). Second, distinguishing 
indirect bailouts from mere subsidies (especially for non-financial firms) can be 
difficult as the distinction turns on whether the purpose of the transfer is to prevent 
a liquidity crisis for the firm’s stakeholders. And the likelihood that such a liquidity 
crisis would result from the firm’s collapse is difficult to measure. Thus, the 
assertion that the government is making the transfer for that purpose can rarely be 
proven or refuted with any certainty.  
2. Ex Post 
The second feature of the definition just laid out is that the bailout must come ex 
post—as a transfer that was not paid for in advance, as in the case of insurance.40 
Ex ante safety nets are insurance rather than bailouts. To be clear about this point, 
imagine a timeline in which an agent makes an investment at time 1, and the 
investment is realized as a success or failure at time 2. If the government believes 
that the investment should be subsidized, it may offer a tax break, loan guarantee, 
or other subsidy to the agent before time 1. Such a subsidy is not a bailout. By 
contrast, if the investment fails at time 2, and then the government makes a 
transfer to the agent to prevent it from defaulting on its obligations, a bailout has 
occurred. 
                                                
39 One could also have an indirect bailout of the counterparties of the counterparties (and so on). 
40 On the difference between ex post and ex ante legal norms, see Louis Kaplow, Rules versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 571–77 (1992). 
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The clearest example of government insurance is the FDIC program.41 Banks 
pay premiums for this insurance, and in return depositors are entitled to 
compensation from the FDIC of up to $250,000 if the bank is unable to pay them. 
FDIC insurance, in principle, is not a subsidy because banks must pay premiums; 
thus, the payment to the depositors is not a bailout. Moreover, even if FDIC 
insurance is underpriced, as is sometimes argued,42 the payouts are not bailouts 
because depositors have a legal right to the payouts. The underpricing of FDIC 
insurance is just a typical ex ante subsidy.   
By contrast, the Fed’s power under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act does 
give the Fed the power to make bailouts.43 Under 13(3), the Fed can make below-
market loans to illiquid non-bank institutions. These institutions do not make ex 
ante payments to the Fed, and have no legal entitlement to the loans, so 13(3) 
cannot be classified as an insurance program. The purpose of a 13(3) loan is to 
enable the borrower to pay its debts; hence, a 13(3) loan is a bailout.44 
An interesting middle case is the Fed’s power to make discount-window loans to 
banks under section 10(b).45 The banks that receive these loans make mandatory 
capital contributions to a Federal Reserve Bank, but these contributions are not 
priced to reflect future need for loans. On the other hand, banks do pay interest on 
the loans ex post, and must submit ex ante to regulation. Legally, the loans are 
discretionary rather than as of right; yet banks expect them and the Fed has a legal 
obligation to use the discount window to end banking panics. For this reason, 
section 10(b) loans fall somewhere between a pure bailout and an insurance payout. 
This two-part definition can be applied to distinguish close cases. Under our 
definition, government loans to victims of natural disasters should be classified as 
bailouts to the extent that those loans are designed to enable victims to avoid 
defaulting on debts. People do not pay ex ante for the legal right to these payments, 
so disaster programs are not insurance. At the same time, transfers to victims of 
natural disasters are not always designed to address the financial shock created by 
the disaster or enable the people to pay off their debts. Their general purpose is 
                                                
41 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, WHO IS THE FDIC?, (Oct. 30. 2014), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/. 
42 George G. Pennacchi, A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under-) Pricing of Deposit Insurance, 19 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 340 (1987). 
43 Federal Reserve Act, § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
44 Not everyone agrees that an emergency loan of this type should be called a “bailout.” For example, 
the former central banker Paul Tucker uses “bailout” to refer only to loans to insolvent firms. See 
Tucker, supra note 36, at 40. We use the term more broadly than he does, following popular usage. 
45 Federal Reserve Act § 10B, 12 U.S.C. § 347(b) (2012). 
14 
 
often humanitarian compensation rather than macroeconomic intervention. So 
natural disaster relief lies close to the borderline of our definition.46 
3. Targeted 
In practice, people refer to bailouts as transfers that are made to specific firms or 
an industry. This feature of our definition is not essential to it; in principle, the 
government could bail out the entire economy. When the Fed reduces interest rates, 
it provides just such a bailout—an ex post transfer in the form of liquidity, which 
benefits banks and ideally encourages them to lend to businesses and consumers.47 
Some economists support such open-market operations while opposing bailouts.48 
They are bothered not so much by ex post government intervention but by targeted 
intervention that may be influenced by political considerations. 
Bailouts can take other forms as well. In 2008, the Fed purchased commercial 
paper from eligible firms.49 In doing so, it provided low-cost liquidity to a class of 
firms. The Fed’s actions kept them alive but did not fully bail them out. We refer to 
this type of support as a “partial bailout.” 
B. Disguised Bailouts 
The definition can be difficult to apply where the transfer itself is disguised or 
hidden. We call these transfers “disguised bailouts.” They take place without an 
explicit transfer of consideration to a firm. In the S&L crisis, regulators initially 
tried to rescue insolvent firms by encouraging solvent firms to buy them. Since the 
insolvent firms had negative value, the regulators “paid” the solvent firms in the 
form of regulatory forbearance—promising not to enforce certain regulations 
against them. Since those regulations imposed costs on the firms in question, 
regulatory forbearance amounted to a transfer of value. As another example, the 
government in 1998 bailed out the creditors of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
                                                
46 Many of the questions that arise in the bailout context – such as moral hazard, discretion, and 
political favoritism – are similar to those that arise in the context of disaster relief. See, e.g., Howard 
Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101 (2006). There are, therefore, many parallels between the analysis we 
present and the literature on disaster relief. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design 
and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2003) (identifying important principles for 
designing terror-victim relief programs). But there are important differences between disaster relief 
and bailouts. Chief among them is the fact that bailouts, properly understood, are designed 
exclusively to contain macroeconomic risk, while disaster relief may be defended on humanitarian or 
distributive grounds even where it does not reduce externalities or prevent further economic loss. 
47 A similar response would be to relax regulations during periods of high unemployment. See 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unemployment, Regulation, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 579 (2011). 
48 Fischer, supra note 33, at 91. 
49 See infra II.D.2. 
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Management by persuading all of them to agree to haircuts. The government did 
not pay money to anyone, but it did manage to force firms to act against their 
inclination. How it did so is not clear. The government has enormous regulatory 
power over banks—it can, for example, block mergers and extensions of certain 
lines of business. The government might have implicitly bribed banks by promising 
to approve future mergers that it would not otherwise have approved; or it might 
have implicitly threatened not to approve future mergers that it would otherwise 
have approved. In either case, the government effected a bailout. 
Or, consider, as a final example, the argument that the government bailed out 
the steel industry in 1999 and 2000 by imposing trade barriers on foreign imports.50 
The trade barriers artificially raised the price of steel in the United States, which 
resulted in greater revenues for the steel industry. This is economically not much 
different from taxing consumers and using the proceeds to bail out the industry. 
While we focus in his paper on explicit bailouts, it is important to see that if 
bailouts are understood in a functional way, they may well be ubiquitous rather 
than rare. 
C. Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries of Bailouts 
As noted above, the beneficiaries of the bailout are not always the direct 
recipients of the transfer. Imagine two Banks, X and Y. Bank X owns $100 in 
illiquid assets, and owes $90 in the form of a demand deposit to Bank Y. Bank Y has 
a single asset, the demand deposit with X worth $90, and owes $80 to its own 
depositors. Both banks have equity of $10. During a liquidity crisis, Bank Y might 
attempt to withdraw its $90 from Bank X, which would drive X into bankruptcy if it 
cannot sell its assets for that much, as is likely. If Bank X collapses and can only 
raise, say, $50, to give to Bank Y, then Bank Y will also collapse—because it cannot 
afford to pay its depositors. 
Suppose the government bails out Bank X by lending it $90. Bank X can repay 
Y, and thus stay in business long enough to sell its illiquid assets or obtain new 
creditors. Thus, it is easy to see that the government saves Bank X. But the 
government also saves Bank Y. By enabling Bank X to pay back Bank Y in full, the 
government also enables Bank Y to pay its depositors. The bailout of X is direct; the 
bailout of Y is indirect but no less real. 
The government could also save X by bailing out Y. If the government lends $80 
to Y so that Y can pay back its depositors, then Y may feel no need to withdraw its 
$90 from X. In this case the government bails out Y directly, and X indirectly. 
                                                
50 Raymond Hernandez, Santorum, Defender of Free Market, Pushed in Congress to Protect Big Steel, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2012, at A6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/santorum-free-market-defender-used-to-aid-steel-
industry.html. 
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This distinction is important because even though the actions are functionally 
identical, often the public identifies only the direct recipient as the beneficiary of 
the bailout, and may put pressure on the government to punish direct recipients but 
not to punish indirect recipients. In the first case, for example, the government 
might respond to publish pressure by demanding that X pay a high interest rate to 
the government, or give it equity. X is penalized, and Y is not, but Y is just as much 
a beneficiary of government action as X is. 
Insiders and sophisticated commentators, by contrast, are well-aware of this 
phenomenon. When the U.S. government participated in the bailout of Mexico in 
1994, experts understood that major beneficiaries were U.S. banks, including 
Citigroup, whose loans to Mexico were at stake.51 Indeed, stock prices of U.S. banks 
with exposure to the crisis responded to announcements of progress and setbacks in 
the U.S. bailout talks.52 
Similarly, when the government bailed out AIG, it wiped out most of AIG’s 
equity, which was politically popular. But the indirect beneficiaries of the bailout—
AIG’s creditors and counterparties—did not suffer any loss in equity. Critics of the 
AIG bailout accused the government of engaging in a “backdoor bailout” of AIG’s 
counterparties.53 Similarly, the indirect beneficiaries of the GM and Chrysler 
bailouts of 2009 were employee-creditors, while shareholders—the nominal direct 
beneficiaries—were wiped out.54  
D. The Structure of a Bailout 
The government has many degrees of freedom when designing a bailout, and can 
use this freedom to favor or discriminate against various stakeholders. Imagine a 
firm like GM on the brink of default. The government could lend GM enough money 
                                                
51 NOMI PRINS, ALL THE PRESIDENTS’ BANKERS (2014) (“Heavy hitters like BankAmerica, Chase 
Manhattan, Chemical Banking, Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, and J. P. Morgan…accounted for nearly 74 
percent of Latin American exposure, or $40.4 billion. The bailout saved them, and later enabled 
them to buy Mexican banks that were weakened as a result. A decade later, foreign banks, led by 
Citigroup in the United States, owned 74 percent of Mexican financial assets.”). Rubin’s public 
position was that the bailout was a regrettable necessity: “Alan, Larry, and I all opposed making the 
holders of Tesobonos whole. But we concluded – I think rightly – that Mexico couldn’t be rescued 
without the side effect of helping some investors.” ROBERT RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON, 11–12 (2004). Not 
everyone was convinced. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL, 34 (2010) (“accusations at the time 
that Rubin had actually organized the international bailout in an effort to save Goldman Sachs”). 
52 Osman Kilic, M. Kabir Hassan, & David R. Tufte, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bank Risk 
and the Mexican Peso Crisis, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 139, 144–45 (1998) (finding that stocks of U.S. banks 
with exposure to Mexican loans experienced abnormal positive and negative returns in responses to 
announcements of progress and setbacks, respectively, in U.S. bailout talks).  
53 See infra II.E.2. 
54 See infra II.D.3. 
17 
 
to pay off its creditors. This loan benefits those creditors, who otherwise would be 
partially repaid from GM’s assets; and shareholders, who retain the value of their 
equity. The bailout benefits all creditors. 
However, the government could also offer a loan that provides more limited 
benefits. For example, it could demand that all creditors receive haircuts, and that 
shareholder equity be diluted or even wiped out. It can also discriminate within 
groups. In the GM loan, for example, the government ensured that employees as 
pension creditors received higher payoffs as a fraction of their claims than other 
creditors. Dealers brought a lawsuit claiming that the government discriminated 
against them by requiring GM to terminate its contractual relationships with them. 
The government also wiped out the shareholders. 
The government treated financial institutions with a great deal of variation as 
well. Many banks received emergency loans from the Fed that fully preserved 
shareholder value. Banks that received TARP money had to submit to various 
dilutions of shareholder equity. Bear and AIG shareholders also were subject to 
bespoke dilutions. One important issue concerned whether the government should 
obtain equity in a firm that it bails out. Before EESA, the government took equity 
only from AIG; after EESA, using the authorizations in that statue, the government 
received equity from financial institutions into which it pumped TARP money. 
While the question whether the government should take equity or not is outside 
the scope of this Article, we should note some of the relevant considerations. The 
justification for taking equity is that it gives the government, and hence the 
taxpayer, the upside if the target firm recovers; this compensates the government 
for the risk that it takes. Moreover, equity may give the government control over 
the firm, which allows it to influence the firm’s operations and hence maximize the 
probability of repayment. And by reducing payoffs to shareholders, equity transfers 
may counter moral hazard. But there are also fears that the government will abuse 
control of corporations for political purposes. Since World War II, in the United 
States (unlike many other countries) the government has avoided taking a 
controlling share of equity in corporations because of political opposition toward 
government meddling in industry.55 The government can protect itself from default 
with devices that are less subject to abuse, like loan covenants. One might also 
worry that the government could use emergency conditions to take an excessively 
large equity interest because firms that would otherwise go bankrupt lack the 
bargaining power that would be necessary to ensure that terms are fair. 
                                                
55 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 389 (1995) (recounting the rise of 
government corporations during the world wars and Great Depression, and the subsequent actions 
to reverse that trend). The current prohibition on government-controlled corporations is embodied in 
the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (2012), which prohibits agencies 
from establishing or acquiring corporations without congressional consent. 
18 
 
E. Who Makes the Bailout? 
Because of their ex post nature, one might think that Congress must make 
bailouts by appropriating funds and distributing them to beneficiaries. In fact, 
Congress has in a number of statutes delegated the power to make bailouts to other 
entities—above all, the Fed. Section 10(b) of the Federal Reserve Act gives the Fed 
the power to quasi-bail out banks, and section 13(3) gives the Fed the power to bail 
out non-bank financial institutions. The Fed has this power in part as a result of its 
unique ability to fund itself from its operations. The FDIC also has a traditional 
power to make bailouts by rescuing banks that pose a systemic threat; in these 
cases, the FDIC may pay all of the bank’s creditors to the full extent of their claims, 
not just depositors who are covered by insurance.56 The FDIC has a fund, paid for 
through its regular assessments on banks, that it can draw on to make such 
payments. Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to borrow from the Treasury in order to 
make bailouts if the fund is depleted.57 
The difference between a congressional bailout and an agency bailout is 
important because Congress can regulate agency bailouts by putting appropriate 
conditions in the statute. Dodd-Frank does just that—by requiring that consulting 
and approval take place in the executive branch, and limiting the power of the Fed 
to bail out individual firms (as opposed to classes of firms).58 By contrast, any effort 
by Congress to regulate itself by issuing restrictions on its own bailouts in advance 
runs into time-inconsistency problems. If Congress enacts a statute restricting or 
regulating bailouts at time 1, and then enacts another statute at time 2 that 
authorizes a bailout, it can explicitly or implicitly repeal the time 1 statute in the 
process. Nonetheless, a general bailout statute at time 1 may not be easy to 
overturn. An explicit overturning of the statute may be politically embarrassing, 
and courts may not recognize an implicit overturning, reasoning instead that the 
first statute is meant to structure the second statute.59 There are many analogies to 
this style of reasoning; for example, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hold that the 
2001 AUMF against Al Qaeda implicitly overturned statutes that regulate 
surveillance and other matters.60 
                                                
56 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)) (2012); for a description of how the systemic risk exception has been 
used, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION 
(Apr. 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10100.pdf. 
57 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 210(n), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2012).  
58 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 203, 1101, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5383, 343 
(2012). 
59 See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L J. 1215, 1235 (2001). 
60 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006). 
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F. Some Recent Bailouts 
 Bailouts might seem extraordinarily rare but they are not. In the table below, 
we list ten bailouts from the last forty years—one every four years. The table does 
not include the bailout of New York City in 1975, or the various bailouts of 
sovereigns—like Mexico in 1995—that benefited American holders of foreign debt. 
Arguably, when the Fed lowers interest rates in order to head off a financial crisis—
as it did starting in 2007—it is engaging in a kind of bailout of all firms that, as a 
consequence, can borrow money more cheaply than otherwise. However, in popular 
usage, bailouts are targeted to individual firms or classes of firms, and we will stick 
to that usage. 
 The bailouts differ in many ways. In some cases, the government bailed out 
multiple firms in whole industries—the S&L bailout and the bailouts of 2008-2009. 
In other cases, it bailed out single firms. Bailouts took different forms—as cash 
transfers, loans, and loan guarantees. Bailouts can also be disguised, which is why 
we include the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 when the 
government did not spend any money but may have used an implicit promise of 
regulatory forbearance in order to persuade creditors to agree to haircuts.61 The 
government bailed out financial firms for the most part, but also bailed out 
manufacturing firms and transport firms. 
 
Table 1: Some Recent Bailouts62 
                                                
61 See supra I.E. 
62 The information in the table is compiled from the following sources. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, CED-76-171, IMPROVED CONTROLS NEEDED OVER FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO 
RAILROADS (1976); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PSAD-78-66, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT (1978); Ana J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount 
Window, 74 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 58 (1992); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. REEARCH SERV., 
R40005, CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS, AND 
COST (2008); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust 
Company, in MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE, Part II, Chapter 4 (1998); 
Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 
FDIC BANKING REVIEW 26 (2000); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-123, RESOLUTION 
TRUST CORPORATION’S 1995 AND 1994 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1996); THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING 
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (1999); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-836, LEGACY AIRLINES MUST 
FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE PROFITABILITY (Aug. 2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243741.pdf; Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 
101(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)); Deborah 
Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizen with Equity Managed by a Community Trust, in 
Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks for Businesses, 15 CORN. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y. 231, 
286-88 (2006); THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; Paul Kiel & Dan 
Ngyuen, Bailout Tracker, PROPUBLICA, (Jan 23, 2015) http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/; CONG. 
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Year Beneficiary Amount Spent or 
Loaned by 
Government 
Outcome 
1970 Penn Central 
Railroad 
$556 Million Reorganized 
1971 Lockheed $245 Million Recovered 
1974 Franklin Bank $1.75 Billion Liquidated 
1980 Chrysler $1.2 Billion Recovered 
1984 Continental Bank $49.6 Billion Liquidated 
1989 Savings & Loan 
Industry 
$132 Billion Liquidated 
1998 Long-Term Capital 
Management 
$0  Liquidated 
2001 Airline Industry $6.56 Billion Industry recovered 
2008-2009 Financial Sector and 
Homeowners 
$534 Billion Industry 
recovered 
2008 Chrysler & GM $80 Billion Reorganized 
 
 The table provides a very rough description of the outcome in each case. We 
will provide details of several bailouts in Part II, but it is worth pointing out here 
that most of the bailouts were at least superficially successful. In most cases, the 
government broke even or made substantial profits on loans and other investments; 
and the bailed-out firm or industry recovered. But all the bailouts were intensely 
controversial. Why they were is the topic of the next part. 
                                                                                                                                                       
OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND 
REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTO INDUSTRY (Sep. 9, 2009); BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41978, THE ROLE OF TARP ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL 
MOTORS, 5–6 (May, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41978.pdf.  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
We discuss below a number of the bailouts in Table 1. As we will see, criticisms 
of most of these bailouts fall into four categories. First, critics frequently argue that 
a proposed bailout is what we will call “ex post inefficient”—a pure transfer to a 
lucky group of stakeholders that does not produce a net social good and wastes the 
taxpayers’ dollars. Second, bailouts often appear unfair or discriminatory because 
they help one group of people while the government does not help similarly situated 
people—stakeholders in other firms that do not receive a bailout. Third, bailouts 
might generate moral hazard by creating the expectation that in future other firms 
will receive bailouts, an expectation that may distort the incentives of market 
agents. Fourth, critics sometimes argue that the government has issued a bailout in 
a procedurally irregular way—with insufficient transparency and inadequate 
opportunities for stakeholders and others to make their views known about the 
wisdom of the bailout or how it should be structured. 
A. The Lockheed Bailout 
In the early 1970s, Lockheed Corporation, an important aerospace manufacturer 
(one of the companies that later merged to form today’s Lockheed Martin), ran into 
financial difficulties when a major project ran over budget and one of its suppliers 
filed for bankruptcy. Lockheed argued that if it were forced into bankruptcy, its 
failure would damage the airline industry and cause massive job losses in 
California.63 As the nation’s largest defense contractor,64 Lockheed was also vital to 
the war effort in Vietnam. Congress responded to Lockheed’s pleas by enacting the 
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, under which the government provided Lockheed 
with a $250 million loan guarantee. 
Supporters of the bailout emphasized the macroeconomic costs of bankruptcy.65 
President Nixon argued that a Lockheed failure would destroy jobs.66 The Secretary 
of Treasury added that Lockheed’s most recent troubles were not its fault but had 
                                                
63 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-169300, IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT 
(1972), available at http://gao.gov/assets/210/203532.pdf. 
64 Id. at 6. 
65 Divisions did not follow party lines. Republicans in the Senate voted 27-17 for the bill while 
Democrats voted 22-31 and Southern democrats split 9-8 in the Senate. The divisions in the House 
were similar. Lockheed Loan Guarantee Bill Cleared on Close Votes, 27 CONG. Q. ALMANAC (1971), 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal71-1252844.  
66 Id. (“President Nixon at San Clemente, Calif., May 5 told a news conference the major factor, in 
his view, was the unemployment that would be caused by a Lockheed bankruptcy and consequent 
abandonment of the L-1011 program.”). 
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resulted in part from government cancelations of major projects.67 Unions and 
banks also warned of the negative macroeconomic effects of a Lockheed failure.68 
Critics of a bailout argued that the macroeconomic effects of failure would be 
small, while the bailout would be costly  for the government. A representative of the 
United Auto Workers union testified that the lost production of Lockheed would be 
picked up by McDonnell Douglas, which “would be highly advantageous to the 
American aerospace worker.”69 A report by the majority staff of the House Banking 
and Currency Committee found a “substantial risk of default and loss to the 
government in the proposed guarantee.”70 
Critics and defenders also argued about the general propriety of bailouts. The 
Fed sought permanent authority for the government to issue loan guarantees.71 On 
the other side, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin noted his opposition to “insulating big 
business from failure.” He pointed out that none of the more than 10,000 small 
businesses that failed in 1970 were being bailed out.72 Other testimony highlighted 
the moral hazard problem, noting that the failures at hand raised a presumption of 
mismanagement.73 
In the end, the bill passed. Ostensibly, it authorized loan guarantees to all 
troubled firms whose failure would have systemic effects. The Act created a Loan 
Guarantee Board and provided that it could guarantee a loan 
only if (1) the Board finds that (A) the loan is needed to enable the borrower to 
continue to furnish goods or services and failure to meet this need would 
adversely and seriously affect the economy of or employment in the Nation or 
any region thereof,  (B) credit is not otherwise available to the borrower under 
reasonable terms or conditions, and  (C) the prospective earning power of the 
borrower, together with the character and value of the security pledged, furnish 
reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay the loan within the time fixed, 
                                                
67 Id. The chairman of Bank of American, a major lender to Lockheed, also testified to Congress that 
“to a great extent, the federal government shares responsibility and thus the federal government has 
an obligation to assist the firm through its present liquidity crisis.” Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. (quoting the Fed Chair, “Developments over the past year or so have underscored the need for 
standby authority for government guarantees of loans to business firms in emergencies where the 
alternative could be severe damage to the national economy.”). 
72 Id.  
73 Id. (summarizing the testimony of Senator Cranston of California who had proposed requiring the 
management to resign as a condition for the bailout). 
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and afford reasonable protection to the United States; and (2) the lender certifies 
that it would not make the loan without such guarantee.74 
But Lockheed was the only firm to apply for or receive assistance under the act.75 
The amount of guaranteed loans topped out at $245 million in 1974.76 The loan 
guarantee was terminated in 1977 as part of a refinancing that replaced the 
government-supported loans.77 The government earned $25.5 million in 
commitment fees.78 
The Lockheed controversy set the terms of the debates for future bailouts. First, 
critics thought that the macroeconomic benefits of a bailout would be slim and the 
government would lose money. While we do not know whether they were correct on 
the first point, they were wrong on the second. Second, critics argued that the 
bailout was unfair because other firms did not receive bailouts, and Lockheed 
benefited from its political connections. Questions also arose as to whether the 
bailout could or should be structured to be distributively fair. Third, the question of 
moral hazard arose as participants debated whether Lockheed or the government 
was at fault for Lockheed’s financial distress, and whether one bailout would give 
rise to additional bailouts.79 
B. 1979 Chrysler Bailout 
In 1979 Chrysler had lost over a billion dollars. It had negative working capital 
and was unable to borrow on the market.80 Congress and the White House 
responded by negotiating a bailout program that would inject $1.5 billion of capital 
into the firm through a government guarantee. The government agency 
administering the guarantee estimated that the failure of Chrysler would “lower 
                                                
74 Emergency Loan Guarantee Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
1843(a)). 
75 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PSAD-78-66, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY LOAN 
GUARANTEE ACT 1 (1978). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2. The Board reported receiving $26,503,683 in fees with costs of $983,094. During the 
course of the program, the Board invested the fees it received in government securities and reported 
an additional $4.9 million in revenue from interest on those investments. 
79 While eight years passed between the Lockheed bailout and the Chrysler bailout, critics argued 
that the first set the stage for the second by rewarding bad management. For example, when the 
Chicago Tribune ran an editorial criticizing the 1979 Chrysler bailout, it stated, “As we and others 
warned at the time, the $250 million in federal loan guarantees to Lockheed has set a bad precedent. 
It says in effect that big business needn’t worry if it doesn’t function efficiently enough to stay 
competitive. The government will be there to rescue inefficient enterprises.” Editorial, It’s Still a 
Bailout, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 11, 1979, at sec. 8 p. 1. 
80 Chrysler Records History-Making Losses, THE ARGUS-PRESS, Feb. 8, 1980, at 4. 
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GNP by $5 billion in 1980 and $6 billion in 1981.”81 Between 700,000 and 1 million 
jobs and the solvency of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation were also put at 
risk.82 The job-loss estimates were challenged by critics who argued that lost 
production by Chrysler would be picked up by the other Detroit automakers.83 
The bailout took the form of a loan guarantee approved by the Chrysler 
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act.84 Up to $1.5 billion was made available in 
guarantees. The Act required that additional funds of at least $1.43 billion be raised 
from non-federal sources, and that some of those funds would come in the form of 
haircuts on existing stakeholders.85 Thus, existing domestic lenders were required 
to provide $400 million in new loans and $100 million in concessions on existing 
loans. The remaining funds were to be contributed by foreign lenders ($150 million), 
state and local governments ($250 million), suppliers and dealers ($180 million), 
proceeds from asset sales ($300 million), and the issuance of new equity ($50 
million).86 An additional $587.5 million in concessions were required from 
employees, primarily in reduced compensation for union employees.87  
Chrysler was the nation’s tenth largest company;88 its financial problems posed a 
greater risk to the economy than Lockheed’s did. As in Lockheed, the debate about 
the wisdom of a bailout centered on ex post efficiency, fairness, moral hazard, and 
the likelihood of failure. Ralph Nader noted, 
Opponents of the Chrysler bill filled their recitals with arguments that it was 
a bad precedent, that it was unfair to thousands of failing small businesses 
which are not given federal bail-outs, that the loan guarantee would not be 
enough to save Chrysler as a full-line auto manufacturer, that Chrysler could 
reorganize and scale down to a smaller, efficient company, and that the 
taxpayers shouldn’t be required to do what the banks would not do.89 
                                                
81 Findings of Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board, quoted in Paul H. Wilson Jr. & Peter L. 
Borowitz, Working out with the Government: The Chrysler Loan Guarantee Program, 20 J. LAW & 
COMMERCE, 19, 21 (1984). 
82 BICKLEY, supra note 62. There were some national security arguments as well because Chrysler 
manufactured a major battle tank for the military. Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74, 631, 1901).  
85 Pub. L. No. 96-185 §§ 4(a)(4), 4(a)(6), 93 Stat. 1326 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1863). 
86 Pub. L. No. 96-185 § 4(c), 93 Stat. 1327 (1980) (codified at 13 U.S.C. § 1863). 
87Pub. L. No. 96-185 § 6(a), 93 Stat. 1329 (1980) (codified at 13 U.S.C. § 1865). 
88 Brian M. Freeman & Allan I. Mendelowitz, Program in Search of a Policy: The Chrysler Loan 
Guarantee, 1 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 443, 445 (1982). 
89 Ralph Nader, Free Enterprise Undermined in Chrysler Bailout, THE NADER PAGE, (Dec. 30, 1979), 
https://blog.nader.org/1979/12/30/free-enterprise-undermined-in-chrysler-bailout/. 
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However, at least in hindsight, we can say that the bailout was a success: it both 
saved Chrysler and generated a profit for the government. Chrysler took $1.2 billion 
in guaranteed loans and redeemed them all by 1982.90 In exchange for its 
guarantee, the government took a security interest in Chrysler’s assets, and 
received an annual 1% guarantee fee. The government also took warrants to 
purchase shares that represented 10 to 15% of Chrysler’s common stock. Those 
warrants were sold after Chrysler recovered and functioned as an additional $311 
million fee that the government collected on its guarantee.91 However, some critics 
argue that the government made money on the bailout only because it imposed 
import quotas that artificially inflated Chrysler’s sales—in effect, taxing car 
buyers.92 If so, the bailout may not have been ex post efficient.   
The charge of unfairness cannot be so easily dismissed. Critics saw no sense in 
imposing haircuts on creditors and employees in order to transfer value to 
shareholders who would have otherwise been wiped out.93 The head of GM criticized 
the bailout as favoring a failed competitor: “If you say, ‘O.K., if somebody fails in the 
competitive race, then we’re going to bail them out anyway,’ I don’t think that’s in 
accordance with what really made this country great.”94 Economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith lamented the power of corporations to secure favorable treatment: “Even 
the finest and firmest free enterprise principles, we know, can be bent as needed to 
pecuniary and corporate need.”95 He also commented that if the bailout was 
inevitable, the public should at least have received an ownership stake in the firm. 
Finally, worries of moral hazard loomed large. Many of those leveling fairness 
objections tied them to moral hazard. A Businessweek editorial argued that the 
bailout “would set a dangerous precedent of relieving management, the board of 
directors, and the stockholders of responsibility for the company’s good health.”96 
Congress sought to address this concern by imposing haircuts on employees and 
creditors. Perhaps the moral hazard (and unfairness concerns) raised at the time 
                                                
90 BICKLEY, supra note 62, at 4. 
91 Paul H. Wilson, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, Working out with the Government: The Chrysler Loan, 20 
J. LAW & COMMERCE, 19, 37-38 (1984). 
92 BICKLEY, supra note 62, at 4. 
93 James K. Hickel, The Chrysler Bailout Bust, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 276 (Jul.13, 
1983), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1983/07/the-chrysler-bail-out-bust (arguing that the 
only difference between a the bailout and a Chapter 11 bankruptcy was the value retained by 
shareholders gambled on a bailout and won). 
94 Quoted in MANUEL VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 7TH ED., Chapter 3 (2011), 
available at http://faculty.wiu.edu/E-
Solymossy/Presentations/MGT%20481/Case%20Studies/The%20Chrysler%20Loan.pdf 
95 Id. 
96 Chrysler: No Bailout, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 132. 
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would have been reduced if Congress had imposed a greater cost on shareholders. 
But once again the moral hazard claims are at best theoretical possibilities. There is 
no evidence that the Chrysler bailout caused other firms to engage in 
mismanagement or risky investments. 
C. S&L Bailouts 
In the 1980s, a large number of bank-like financial institutions known as 
Savings & Loans (S&Ls) and Savings Banks collapsed.97 S&Ls (and Savings Banks, 
but henceforth we will refer to both types of bank as S&Ls or thrifts) were a type of 
bank that mainly served consumers by issuing mortgages to homeowners and 
offering checking accounts. They mostly stayed out of commercial lending and 
deposit-taking. The thrift industry was a stable and profitable business from the 
Depression until the 1970s. In the 1970s, interest rates rose sharply because of 
budget deficits, the oil shock, and other adverse market conditions. In addition, the 
government permitted money market mutual funds to offer checking-like services to 
consumers and to pay them a market interest rate. S&Ls initially lost business to 
the mutual funds because they were not permitted to charge a high rate of interest. 
The government responded by allowing S&Ls to charge a market interest rate, but 
now the problem was that the interest rates demanded by depositors exceeded the 
very low interest rates on the 30-year mortgages that the S&Ls had issued when 
interest rates were very low. As a result of this squeeze, many S&Ls became 
undercapitalized and possibly insolvent. 
Congress, state legislatures (which established rules of state S&Ls, as opposed 
to nationally chartered S&Ls), and regulators responded in the early 1980s by 
further deregulating S&Ls.98 They hoped that by allowing S&Ls to diversify into 
different markets, such as commercial real estate, and to offer new types of loans, 
like adjustable-rate mortgages, they would enable S&Ls to return to profitability. 
Unfortunately, deregulation caused many S&Ls to take on additional risk. Many 
S&Ls expanded their operations in order to enter the new markets. To do so, they 
needed additional sources of funds, which they obtained by offering increasingly 
high interest rates for deposits. Because of deposit insurance, depositors did not pay 
attention to the credit risk of the S&Ls in which they put their funds. Many S&Ls 
used this money to make risky loans that went sour, and as a consequence 
hundreds of S&Ls collapsed.99 
                                                
97 For accounts, see, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The Savings and Loan Crisis and 
Its Relationship to Banking, in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, Vol. 1 Chap. 4, 
178–181 (1997), available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf. 
98 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 
Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
99 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 97, at 171-81.  
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S&L regulators initially tried to rescue failing S&Ls by persuading healthy 
S&Ls and banks to buy them.100 Because no one wants to buy a firm with negative 
value, the regulators compensated the buyers by offering to excuse them from 
various regulatory requirements. However, this strategy just weakened the healthy 
institutions, and Congress put an end to it (in the process making the government 
liable for breach of contract).101 Congress finally cleaned up the mess by authorizing 
regulators to borrow enough funds to pay off depositors and hold the assets of the 
failed S&Ls until they could be sold off at market prices. By the end of the crisis, 
hundreds of thrifts had failed. The total cost of the rescue has been estimated at 
$160 billion.102 
While the S&L rescue was widely called a “bailout,” it was not a pure case. As 
the economist Lawrence White has argued, the funds appropriated by Congress 
were used to pay depositors on the basis of their legal entitlement to government-
supplied deposit insurance.103 What was distinctive about the S&L rescue was that 
the existing insurance fund was not large enough to satisfy the government’s 
liabilities, and so Congress was required to appropriate additional funds in order to 
make good on them. With some minor exceptions, depositors received insurance 
payouts only up to the maximum ($100,000).104 Shareholders received nothing. 
Nonetheless, there was a great deal of public outrage directed at the thrifts and 
their regulators, which Congress shared.105 The healthy, well-managed thrifts that 
did nothing wrong were forced to pay a tax to cover some of the costs of the 
insurance payouts.106 The existing regulatory bodies were dissolved and replaced 
with new ones. The outrage was probably due to some highly publicized cases of 
criminal activity and political corruption, as well as the expensive bill for the 
taxpayer that was the result of excessive risk-taking. 
The reason that the S&L rescue was called a “bailout” was probably due to the 
ex post nature of the government intervention. And the term is not as inaccurate as 
White suggests. From an ex ante perspective, the S&L insurance fund was supposed 
                                                
100 U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 847–48 (1996). 
101 Id. at 843. 
102 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 97, at 169. 
103 LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT 
REGULATION 160-64 (1991). 
104 Id. at 162. 
105 Bill to Add Thrift Bailout Funds Dies, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 179 (1991); Vivian Marino, Public 
Reaction to S&L Bailout Ranges from Anger to Apathy with AM-S&SL BJT, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 
10, 1989, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Public-Reaction-to-S-L-Bailout-Ranges-
From-Anger-To-Apathy-With-AM-S-Ls-Bjt/id-884994eee3313a8af8fb7ab82804f1e9.  
106 WHITE, supra note 103. 
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to be self-sustaining, like any insurance funds. The premiums paid by S&Ls should 
in aggregate suffice to cover losses. The government did not bail out the S&Ls so 
much as the insurance fund. 
Although the efforts during the 1980s to save the S&Ls industry without using 
taxpayer funds was ill-advised and poorly executed, the bailout itself—when it came 
in 1989107—seems to have been properly structured. The government was able to 
avoid a fire sale of assets by taking control of them and selling them off over a long 
period of time. As a result, the S&L crisis did not metastasize into a full-blown 
financial crisis despite the thrift industry’s huge share of the mortgage market. 
Moreover, the bailout was necessary to ensure that people believed the 
government’s deposit guarantee—without which S&Ls, and possibly banks, would 
be subject to runs and panics. To address moral hazard, Congress passed legislation 
to strengthen supervision of S&Ls.108 The rescue was fair and nondiscriminatory 
since it simply ensured that people with legal entitlements to insurance payouts 
received them. Shareholders and large creditors did not receive payoffs beyond what 
they were entitled to. 
The 1989 bailout can also be contrasted to the implicit (failed) bailout through 
regulatory forbearance. Because the earlier bailout took the form of secret bargains 
between regulators, S&Ls, and banks, it was not debated publicly. By contrast, the 
government used regular and public procedures to liquidate the assets of failed 
S&Ls after 1989. 
The most important lesson of the S&L bailout came from this earlier botched 
effort by regulators to rescue banks by promising solvent banks and S&Ls that it 
would allow them to reduce capital below regulatory requirements if they purchased 
insolvent S&Ls. Congress later reversed this policy, and banks sued, arguing that 
the government had breached a contract.109 Arguably, the regulators would not 
have resorted to such a desperate and ill-considered measure if they had had access 
to sufficient bailout funds. One benefit of a formal statute or policy that approves of 
and regulates bailouts is that it may weaken the stigma against bailouts, and in 
this way permit regulators to bail out firms when appropriate to do so. 
Another questionable feature of the (final) bailout was the determination to tax 
healthy thrifts in order to (partially) fund the losses from the deposit fund.110 The 
tax was politically popular because it reduced the cost to taxpayers by throwing 
                                                
107 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 
Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
108 Id. 
109 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 858. 
110 Bert Ely, Savings and Loan Crisis, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html (“healthy S&Ls as well as 
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part of the burden on shareholders of the healthy thrifts. But the healthy thrifts 
had done nothing wrong. From an ex ante perspective, the tax informed firms that 
they will be penalized if they belong to an industry that is bailed out whether or not 
those specific firms acted prudently or imprudently. The effect is to enhance rather 
than reduce moral hazard. This is a reminder that temporary political passions—
which often take the effect of wanting to punish a whole industry rather than 
specific bad actors—can result in bad policy. 
D. 9/11 Airline Bailout 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized around 
$15 billion in emergency government funding for the airlines. Under the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), airlines were given 
$5 billion as a direct payment.111 This was framed as compensation for the 
reduction in air travel caused by the grounding of flights after the attacks and the 
subsequent reduction in air traffic. ATSSSA also authorized the Air Transportation 
Safety Board (ATSB) to issue up to $10 billion in further loans or loan guarantees to 
protect failing air carriers.112 The ATSB used that authority to issue loan 
guarantees to some but not all carriers who applied for them after the attacks.113 
Guarantees were provided to America West, American Trans Air, Aloha Airlines, 
Evergreen International Airlines, Frontier Airlines, US Airways, and World 
Airways for a total value of $1.56 billion.114 Similar to the structure in the Chrysler 
bailout, in exchange for those loans the ATSB received warrants in the equity stock 
of those carriers. As a result of those warrants, the loan-guarantee arm of the 
airline bailout has been profitable for the government.115 
Congress did not provide a clear explanation for the airline bailouts.116 One 
possibility is that the airlines would have collapsed without a short-term liquidity 
                                                
111 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 101(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). 
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injection from the government because they owed money on their high fixed costs 
and suddenly were deprived of revenue from ticket sales. However, if this was the 
case, it seems likely that private creditors would have made loans to the airlines; 
moreover, the direct transfer part of the bailout would not have been justified. 
Another possibility is that the bailout was a form of humanitarian relief for airline 
stakeholders, akin to government support for individuals and businesses struck by 
a natural disaster like a hurricane. On this view, the bailout was motivated by 
moral and political, rather than economic, considerations. The government may also 
have worried that even a temporary disruption in airline operations as a result of 
bankruptcy might have exacerbated the general economic downturn caused by the 
shock of the attack. 
 On the other hand, the moral hazard effects of the bailout were probably 
minimal because of the unpredictability of the attack. The 9/11 attack was not the 
sort of disaster that the airlines could have prevented by using ordinary prudence. 
And while one might argue that it was unfair to single out the airlines for relief, 
Congress provided other forms of relief for other direct victims of the 9/11 attack—
so charges of political favoritism were muted. 
The loan-guarantee component of the bailout raises some additional issues. The 
government offered these guarantees to struggling airlines that met certain criteria. 
Firms applying for the guarantee may have failed for reasons unrelated to 9/11. 
Where a mismanaged firm could not be distinguished from a firm that failed 
because of 9/11, the loan guarantee would reward mismanagement the same as any 
other bailout. This is mitigated a bit by the haircuts and oversight that 
accompanied the loan guarantees. 
E. 2008-2009 Financial Crisis Bailouts 
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a large number of bailouts of institutions. 
We cannot describe all of them in the space we have, and so will limit ourselves to a 
few of the most important. 
The immediate cause of the financial crisis was the collapse of housing prices, 
but the severity of the crisis was due to financial innovations that had concentrated 
risk in major financial institutions.117 Most financial institutions were exposed in 
various ways to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and related securities whose 
value was a function of underlying mortgages on houses and other secured loans. 
Some institutions held these securities on their books; many institutions also used 
them as collateral for short-term loans in the repo market; still others guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                                       
goal of the ATSSSA was to avoid the symbolic cataclysm of multiple carriers declaring bankruptcy a 
short time after September 11.”). 
117 See, e.g., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 62; ALAN BLINDER, AFTER THE 
MUSIC STOPPED (2013); RAGHURAM RAJAN, FAULT LINES (2011).  
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them. Although sophisticated investors understood that housing prices could not 
rise forever, they did not understand that the models used to predict the value of 
the CDOs were based on excessively optimistic assumptions about housing prices, 
with the result that people could not calculate the value of the CDOs when 
mortgages began to default at a rate that no one anticipated. 
Other factors played a role as well. Investors had sought safe, high-yielding 
investments and CDOs offered higher rates than similarly rated securities. Ratings 
agencies gave CDOs high ratings because they, too, did not understand the 
assumptions underlying them. The demand for CDOs drove mortgage originators to 
lower underwriting standards so that they could sell more mortgages, and mortgage 
packagers to accept these high-risk mortgages. Meanwhile, investment banks and 
other financial institutions took on ever more leverage. 
The financial crisis was a classic downward spiral. As mortgage defaults 
increased, and people realized that many CDOs would default, lenders refused to 
accept them as collateral except at a steep discount. Financial firms that borrowed 
in the repo market could continue to borrow only by posting higher levels of 
collateral or finding more liquid collateral like treasuries. The most highly 
leveraged firms ran out of collateral, and could no longer borrow. This meant that 
they had to sell their CDOs and related assets in fire sales, which drove down their 
prices. Indeed, all firms facing liquidity shortages sought to unload their CDOs, but 
because everyone was acting the same, there were no buyers. 
As the most highly leveraged firms collapsed, the panic spread to safer firms. 
Even banks, which depend mostly on deposits rather than the repo market, began 
to experience runs. Lenders (including bank lenders) were afraid of lending to a 
firm exposed to CDOs because they could not determine whether the CDOs would 
default or not, and thus whether potential borrowers would be able to repay. AIG, 
an insurance company, faced bankruptcy because it had guaranteed CDOs and had 
invested in mortgage-related securities. At the height of the crisis, banks refused to 
lend to each other or anyone else. The crisis ended when the Fed, FDIC, and other 
government agencies made loans to the market. Some of the toxic assets were taken 
onto the balance sheets of these agencies, which have been able to hold them to 
maturity. 
During the financial crisis, in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009, the press 
reported that the government was engaging in numerous “bailouts.” In fact, many of 
the transactions that were labeled bailouts were not bailouts. Let us distinguish 
several types of transactions. 
1. Fannie/Freddie 
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The Federal National Mortgage Association (better known as Fannie Mae) and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are hybrid public-
private entities often referred to as Government Sponsored Entities or GSEs.118 
The two entities, chartered by acts of Congress but privately owned,119 provide 
support to the secondary market for mortgages. They purchase mortgages from 
lenders, put them into pools, and sell securities backed by those pools. The 
securities entitle the holders to a cash flow based on the principal and interest 
payments due on the underlying mortgages. Fannie and Freddie then guarantee 
those cash flows – providing insurance against defaults. In exchange, they charge a 
guarantee fee. Separately, Fannie and Freddie held large investment portfolios 
including mortgages and mortgage-based assets. The result of these activities was 
to provide liquidity to the mortgage market and, thus, at least in theory, fulfill their 
missions of providing stability and promoting access to mortgage markets. 
When the housing market collapsed in 2007 and 2008, Fannie and Freddie 
began to experience record-setting losses. As mortgage defaults mounted, the 
entities were hit by escalating obligations on the guarantees. By the summer of 
2008 each entity had lost billions of dollars. Default by Fannie and Freddie became 
a real possibility.  
Such a default was likely to create a feedback loop that accelerated losses. The 
default of Fannie and Freddie would directly reduce the liquidity in the mortgage 
market and signal that further liquidity support was unlikely. Banks would then 
originate fewer mortgages, resulting in fewer home sales and a further decline in 
housing prices, and further defaults on mortgages guaranteed by Fannie and 
Freddie.  
This had systemic implications. Because Fannie and Freddie had such massive 
holdings in the secondary mortgage market, many commentators believed that their 
failure would significantly deepen the housing market collapse. As events would 
turn out to reveal, creditors and counterparties were massively exposed to mortgage 
derivatives, and thus, if Fannie and Freddie failed, would suffer enormous losses 
that would reduce liquidity outside of the mortgage market.120  
                                                
118 Dwight Jaffee and John M. Quigley, The Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises: The 
Role for Government in the U.S. Mortgage Market, NBER Working Paper No. 17685 (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17685.pdf.  
119 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536 (codified 
at scattered sections of U.S.C.); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 § 731, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 429 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-56 (2012)).  
120Systemic Risk and the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 
110th Cong. (2008) (written testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson) (explaining 
that “debt and other securities issued by the GSEs are held by financial institutions around the 
world. Continued confidence in the GSEs is important to maintaining financial system and market 
stability.”).  
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At the same time, there was an open question about whether the government 
had guaranteed the debt of Fannie and Freddie in the first place. Although no 
explicit guarantee had been made, market participants generally operated under 
the assumption that the government would back Fannie and Freddie if they 
defaulted and the debt traded at a discount that reflected at least some level of 
guarantee.121 For our analysis, this fact places the case somewhere between ex ante 
insurance and a true bailout. On the one hand, an explicit guarantee is no different 
from ex ante insurance. But this guarantee was uncertain. The legal basis for 
enforcing it was weak at best.122 It is probably more accurate to characterize the 
status quo as an expectation that a bailout would be provided rather than as an 
actual legal entitlement. And – even if an entitlement to the implicit guarantee 
existed —its contours and the mechanism for implementing it were unstated and 
subject to discretion.  
Given the implicit promise, many worried that a default by Fannie and Freddie 
would send a major negative signal about government creditworthiness (or, more 
specifically, its willingness to selectively default) on its general obligations. This 
ended up being a major reason given by the government for launching a bailout.123 
The overall transaction occurred in several steps. The first step was intended to 
be a preventative move to avoid the need for further bailouts. In June of 2008, 
Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), which gave 
                                                
121 As many analysts have noted, this allowed Fannie and Freddie to raise capital at a much lower 
rate that other private participants in the market. 
122 All relevant legal materials explicitly disclaimed any legal obligation to guarantee the debt. 
123 Henry M. Paulson, Statement on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect 
Financial Markets and Taxpayers, Sep. 9, 2008, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx (“These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made 
necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to 
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ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors 
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Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and 
ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt 
and MBS.”); Henry M. Paulson, Remarks on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update, Nov. 
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on it.” ). 
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Treasury the power to make investments to shore up Fannie and Freddie.124 It also 
created the Federal Housing Finance Agency and gave it the power to place Fannie 
and Freddie into conservatorships or receiverships.125 
Just a few months later, the FHFA – working with Treasury and the Fed – 
exercised its power to place the entities into conservatorship and Treasury used its 
new investment power to inject massive capital in the form of preferred equity. The 
documents governing the bailout evolved through amendment as the crisis 
unfolded, but ultimately Treasury made a commitment to provide unlimited funds 
to guarantee liabilities through 2012.126 The plan also included repayment terms 
and a requirement to shrink the investment portfolios of the entities. As part of the 
repayment, Fannie and Freddie had to pay a quarterly dividend at a 10% annual 
rate on the amount that Treasury had invested. In August of 2012 the terms were 
amended again to replace the dividend payment with a “net-income sweep.” This 
meant that instead of paying Treasury a 10% dividend on its investment, each firm 
pays a dividend equal to that firm’s positive net worth (defined as total assets less 
total liabilities).127 The effect is that all net income gets paid to Treasury every 
quarter. That essentially wiped out the remaining interest of all equity holders.128  
                                                
124 Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.); W. Scott Frame, The 
2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta Working Paper No. 2009-13 (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1458662. 
125 Before HERA, Fannie and Freddie were regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO), which had been created in 1992. The OFHEO had statutory authority to place 
Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. But the details of that power were not clear. HERA added 
the power of receivership and set out the substantive and procedural grounds (including judicial 
review) for implementing either the conservatorship or the receivership options.  
126 Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement 
between U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (Dec. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000095012309074293/w76743exv4w1.htm; Second 
Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement between U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Dec. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000095012309073866/f71241exv10w1.htm.  
127 For the first year, the dividend calculation allows the firms to retain a cushion of $3 billion in 
value. For example, if at the end of a quarter Fannie’s net worth (assets minus liabilities) was $10 
billion it would pay a dividend of $7 billion. The $3 billion cushion of value is to be reduced by $600 
million each year until it reaches zero. Third Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred 
Stock Purchase Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (Aug. 17, 
2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000119312512359930/d399489dex41.htm; Third 
Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement between U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Aug. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000119312512359938/d398152dex101.htm.  
128 The amendment also accelerated the reduction in the firms’ investment portfolios. 
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The various stages represent some of the different types of bailouts and bailout-
like actions that the government can use to address the financial difficulties of 
systemically important institutions. 
The law as it stood before HERA provided vague conservatorship authority that 
might be viewed as a grant of bailout authority.129 While the government denied 
that it would bail out Fannie or Freddie, the market seems to have assumed either 
that the law provided bailout authority or that Congress would act if necessary. 
By contrast, HERA was an ex post bailout statute. Once the crisis was 
imminent, Congress took ex post actions to limit the impact of the crisis. To be sure, 
HERA did not implement a bailout; rather it authorized the government to 
implement a bailout. The statute signaled that the government was standing 
behind the debt of Fannie and Freddie.130 In this way, the Congressional 
authorization can be viewed as correcting for Congress’s ex ante failure to create 
sufficient bailout authority. 
The crucial aspects of the bailout were an injection of capital through preferred 
equity that had repayment priority junior to all debt but senior to equity and 
federal control through the FHFA appointed conservator.131 These were pure ex post 
bailout measures taken by the executive branch.  
The net-income sweep of 2012 can be viewed in several different lights. On one 
account, it was just one part of a larger orderly resolution plan to wind down the 
                                                
129 The exact contours of that authority are at the heart of the disputed claims in the current 
litigation. The district court in one of the cases said this much: 
Since 1992, when Congress established FHFA’s predecessor, the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”), the GSEs have been subject to regulatory oversight, 
including the specter of conservatorship or receivership under which the regulatory agency 
succeeds to “all rights” of the GSEs and shareholders…. This enduring regulatory scheme 
governing the GSEs at the time the class plaintiffs purchased their shares represents the 
“background principle” that inheres in the stock certificates. 
Perry Capital LLC v. Lew 2014 WL 4829559 at *20 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2014). This will no doubt be 
litigated further as the cases are appealed. 
130 Public statements made by Treasury in association with the passing of HERA suggest that the 
belief that the mere existence of the power to shore up Fannie and Freddie would be enough to stop 
the bleeding and that the power would not need to be used. As Paulson characterized the move: “if 
you have a bazooka in your pocket and people know it, you probably won’t have to use it.” Recent 
Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses to Them: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry M. Paulson). 
131 N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42760, FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S FINANCIAL 
STATUS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 5-6, 10-11 (Aug. 13, 2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf. 
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firms.132 On another, it might be viewed as an ex post measure to impose a “haircut” 
so as to minimize moral hazard. Or, in the view of unhappy shareholders, it was a 
politically motivated transfer of wealth from equity to the government.133 
With regard to ex post efficiency, Fannie and Freddie have recovered and the 
government made money on the rescue. The magnitude of the profit for the 
government is difficult to calculate because of changes in accounting rules and 
because of the complicated effects of tax credits which both facilitated repayment of 
the loan and reduced tax revenues. Profit measures aside, the bailout prevented a 
more significant collapse of the real estate market and so it is difficult to argue that 
it was inefficient. That is, of course, not to say that no other better bailout options 
existed.  
The moral hazard complaints are once again salient. By rescuing Freddie and 
Fannie’s creditors, the government confirmed that investors who disbelieved the 
government’s no-bailout vow were correct. Critics feared that the bailout thus set 
the stage for endless recurrence of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon—that creditors 
will overinvest in large firms whose collapse would cause a systemic crisis because 
they expect that those firms will be bailed out.134 However, it is possible that this 
message was muted by the specific purposes of housing legislation—to subsidize 
mortgages—which may not be generalizable to other settings. 
Unfairness concerns and potential for political abuse are the subject of current 
litigation over the net-income sweep.135 Plaintiffs claim that the government took 
value from equity in violation of their legal rights because creditors were fully 
                                                
132 The creditors of Fannie and Freddie worried that the firms could suffer future distress under the 
pressure of the 10% dividend obligations to Treasury. Nick Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Stuck in a 
Dividends Circle, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704615504576172420039570798. Both Fannie and 
Freddie had repeatedly increased their obligations to Treasury by borrowing funds to keep current 
on the dividend obligation. Badawi & Casey, supra note 16, at 8. The actions of 2012 addressed this 
by eliminating that obligation and putting in place resolution plan that would protect creditors while 
the firms were wound down. Id. at 8-9. 
133 Complaint, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 365 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (No. 13-465 
C), 2013 WL 3948512; Complaint, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 2014 WL 4829559 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 
13-1025); Complaint, Cacciapelle v. Federal National Mortgage Association, No. 13-cv-1149 (D.D.C. 
July 29, 2013); Complaint, Washington Federal v. United States, No. 13-385 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 
2013). 
134 See William Poole, Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17 
(2009).  
135 Complaint, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 365 (Fed. Cl. 2014) (No. 13-465), 
2013 WL 3948512; Complaint, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 2014 WL 4829559 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 13-
1025); Complaint, Cacciapelle v. Federal National Mortgage Association, (D.D.C. July 29, 2013) (No. 
13-1149); Complaint, Washington Federal v. United States, (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) (No. 13-385). 
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compensated.136 Other critics of the bailouts argued that the government should 
have provided support to homeowners rather than to financial institutions.137  
From the standpoint of process, one can argue that the bailouts were 
procedurally fair because they were publicly debated in Congress. On the other 
hand, litigants challenging the bailout allege that “The Government’s 
conservatorship plan was hatched in secrecy and gave the Companies no choice but 
to accept Government control.”138 They argue that public statements surrounding 
the passage of HERA suggested that the entities were financially sound.139 And 
then the government sprung the bailout package on the companies. The CEO of 
Fannie stated, “[W]e were given 24 hours to accede to a government takeover – or 
else the government would effectively go to war against the company.”140 These 
claims are subject to litigation.141 The litigation itself serves process values by 
forcing the government to provide a public defense of its bailout choices. 
2. Banks, Investment Banks, and Related Institutions 
FDIC insurance. Most commercial banks pay for deposit insurance from the 
FDIC. When banks fail, the FDIC compensates depositors. This type of 
compensation is not a “bailout” because the banks and depositors pay for an ex ante 
insurance scheme and the banks submit to regulation.142 However, the FDIC also 
possesses statutory authority to cover depositors above the insurance limit (which 
was then $100,000) in emergencies.143 The FDIC used that authority to raise the 
limit to $250,000 for existing deposits, and to guarantee certain other forms of bank 
debt.144 Because this intervention was ex post, saved many banks from runs, and 
prevented many bank creditors from defaults, it fits our definition of a bailout. It 
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137 ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT (2014). 
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13-1149); Complaint, Washington Federal v. United States, (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) (No. 13-385) 
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105 Stat. 2236, 2275 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) 2012)).  
144 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION 
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was an agency-led bailout rather than a congressional bailout because the FDIC 
relied on existing statutory authority. 
Discount lending to commercial banks. The Fed has statutory authority to make 
loans to commercial banks.145 During the financial crisis, the Fed made loans 
through its discount window and (as described below) through broad-based 
facilities. Fed discount window-lending is in principle routine: it is always open to 
banks that experience temporary liquidity difficulties. But, in the context of the 
crisis, discount-window lending also resembled bailout lending. Like the FDIC, the 
Fed lent widely to banks experiencing liquidity difficulties, and in this way rescued 
banks and their creditors. The loans were also ex post; like the FDIC emergency 
loans that exceeded the $100,000 limit, banks did not pay for them in the form of ex 
ante premiums. Discount-window lending was supplemented with advances from 
Federal Home Loan Banks, which was also a form of ex post lending.146 
Fed broad-based facilities. The Fed also established numerous broad-based 
credit facilities through which it lent money to classes of borrower that satisfied 
certain eligibility criteria. Some of these facilities supplied credit to commercial 
banks by advancing loans against CDOs.147 Others relied on the Fed’s emergency 
power to make loans to non-banks under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
The Primary Credit Dealer Facility advanced overnight credit to primary dealers 
(mostly, the major investment banks) against various types of collateral, including 
CDOs. Other facilities, notably the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, 
enabled the Fed to advance funds for longer periods of time against toxic assets.148 
Still other facilities provided credit to money market funds and non-financial 
institutions that relied on the commercial paper market.149 Virtually all of these 
facilities provide bailouts in the sense that the money was supplied ex post to firms 
that faced financial difficulties and had not paid premiums that entitled them to 
loans.150 
                                                
145 Federal Reserve Act §§ 10B, 13(3) 12 U.S.C. §§ 347b, 343 (2012). 
146 ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, MORTEN L. BECH, & W. SCOTT FRAME, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK 
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149 Id. at 21–25. 
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The Bear Stearns transaction. In March 2008, creditors cut off credit to Bear 
Stearns, a major investment bank. The Fed rescued Bear by arranging for its sale to 
JP Morgan. Because JP Morgan did not want to own Bear’s toxic assets, the Fed set 
up an entity called Maiden Lane, which bought those assets, financed by a $1.15 
billion loan from JP Morgan and a $28.82 billion loan from the Fed. Bear Stearns 
shareholders were paid $2 per share, later increased to $10.151 The Fed relied on its 
section 13(3) powers. The rescue was a bailout because it was ex post, and it 
ensured that Bear’s creditors were paid in full. Indeed, even Bear’s shareholders 
received some value. 
The AIG transaction. In September of 2008, creditors stopped lending to AIG, a 
large insurance company. Creditors lost confidence in AIG because it had issued 
credit default swaps (CDS) on CDOs, and had speculated in mortgage-based 
securities in its securities lending program. Under the terms of its contracts with 
counterparties, AIG was required to post collateral as the ratings of the CDOs 
declined; this in turn depleted AIG’s liquidity, which caused ratings agencies to 
downgrade AIG. The downgrades then required AIG to post more collateral, 
resulting in a downward spiral. The Fed issued a series of large loans to rescue 
AIG.152 It financed Maiden Lane II, which purchased the mortgage-backed 
securities, and Maiden Lane III, which purchased CDOs from AIG’s CDS 
counterparties.153 This rescue was a bailout because it was a discretionary ex post 
loan, and it ensured that AIG’s creditors were paid in full. AIG’s shareholders also 
retained some value in their shares. 
Equity injections into banks. On October 3, 2008, President Obama signed the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which created the Troubled Assets Relief 
Plan (TARP).154 This program made available $700 billion to purchase toxic assets 
or invest in financial institutions. More than $200 billion of this money was 
committed to the Capital Purchase Program, through which Treasury bought 
preferred stock or senior debt from banks, including large loan guarantees for 
Citibank and Bank of America.155 Unlike earlier bailouts, the funds for these 
bailouts were appropriated by Congress rather than lent by the Fed or another 
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153 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, 
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agency. Thus, Congress itself acted ex post to rescue the banks, and in doing so 
ensured that their creditors were protected. 
 Assistance to homeowners.  The government put in place a number of 
programs to aid homeowners during the financial crisis, the most significant of 
which was the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).156 The Treasury 
committed $75 billion of TARP funds to provide incentives (typically a few hundred 
or thousand dollars per loan) to loan servicers to renegotiate mortgages with 
homeowners who could not make payments, as well as to the investors who own the 
mortgages, and to the homeowners themselves if they made payments under the 
renegotiated mortgages.157 Under the terms of the program, the loan servicer 
reduces mortgage payments, plus taxes and insurance, to 31 percent of the 
homeowner’s income by cutting the interest rate, extending the period of the loan, 
and/or shifting payments to the conclusion of the loan in the form of a balloon 
payment.158 So far, about one million homeowners have benefited from HAMP 
loans.159 Although HAMP was not described as a bailout in public debates, it fits the 
definition of a bailout, albeit only a partial bailout. HAMP indirectly (and partially) 
bailed out qualified homeowners by reducing their liability and extending the loan 
term so that they do not default because of liquidity problems. 
 Treasury showed little enthusiasm for bailing out homeowners; it was 
prodded to do so by Congress.160 The reason appears to be that Treasury believed 
that bailing out financial institutions was a simpler and more direct way of 
addressing the financial crisis.161 Once credit was flowing again, lenders and 
homeowners would voluntarily renegotiate their loans. Thus, the government would 
directly bail out banks but homeowners would receive indirect bailouts. Whether or 
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not Treasury was correct, this approach was politically controversial. The public 
viewed banks as wrongdoers (even though many banks had done nothing wrong) 
and homeowners as victims (even though many homeowners had deliberately 
agreed to risky and expensive mortgages). Under HAMP, the government provided 
direct (partial) bailouts to both creditors and homeowners. 
3. Automobile Companies 
In the fall of 2008, the big-three American automakers – Ford, GM, and Chrysler 
– were in trouble. A long-term decline in their market share had been compounded 
by a dramatic reduction in the overall demand for cars.162 The firms needed to be 
restructured or possibly liquidated. But while Ford had taken on financing prior to 
the financial crisis, GM and Chrysler had no realistic means of raising capital in the 
market once the crisis began. In order to avoid an abrupt collapse of the firms, the 
government provided a bailout. The arguments in favor of a bailout painted a 
doomsday scenario where the failure of any one of the three automakers would 
cause the collapse of their vast network of connected suppliers thus endangering the 
operations of the other two.163 In its extreme version, this scenario would put over 
three million jobs at risk at a time when the economy was already struggling.164  
 The government’s initial response in late 2008 was a stopgap measure.165 GM, 
Chrysler, and their financing arms received over $20 billion in TARP funds.166 The 
more systematic bailout came in 2009 in the structured reorganization of the firms 
through the formal process of the federal Bankruptcy Code with tens of billions of 
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dollars of financing provided by the U.S. and Canadian Governments.167 The total 
investment by the U.S. Treasury approximated $80 billion.168  
The auto payments are plain bailouts. The government injected capital to prop 
up insolvent firms where no legal entitlement existed. The debate over whether 
they were “good” bailouts has focused on the themes that are now familiar. First, 
critics claim that the bailouts were unnecessary support for two failed companies 
that did not present real systemic risk.169 Under this view the government bailed 
out insolvent firms with no strong rationale. Like the other bailouts, the bite of this 
critique is once again softened by subsequent events.170 The auto industry has 
experienced a major recovery and the Treasury has recovered a sizeable portion of 
its investment.171 To say that the government was not fully compensated addresses 
profitability but does not answer the efficiency question. Returns to other 
stakeholders may have offset any loss the government took on the transaction. Even 
conservative estimates suggest that if viewed merely as a jobs program, the bailout 
was inexpensive.172 
                                                
167 See Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy and Reorganizations and the Troubling 
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168U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, AUTO INDUSTRY: PROGRAM OVERVIEW (Jan. 8, 2015),  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 168 .  
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Critics also argued that the bailouts created moral hazard.173 Ford planned and 
obtained market financing for its restructuring earlier and did not ask for 
bailouts.174 Chrysler and GM did not. And so strong arguments can made that GM 
and Chrysler failed not because of the financial crisis but because they had been 
mismanaged. The rescue might then discourage managers in the future from 
making painful adjustments to financing or operations. 
The government tried to address this problem by wiping out equity and imposing 
steep haircuts on senior creditors (who may also have been in a position to force the 
firms to restructure themselves). But it also protected employees by ensuring that 
the union pensions received valuable equity in the reorganized firms and significant 
compensation for many of their claims. The union employees, through the Voluntary 
Employment Beneficiary Association (VEBA), were well compensated for the claims. 
The VEBA received a large stake (in the form of 17.5% of common stock and 
additional preferred stock and warrants) in the new reorganized GM and had a 
large chunk of its claims assumed by the new entity.175 For Chrysler, the outcome 
was similar. Chrysler was sold to an entity controlled by Fiat and financed by the 
United States. Chrysler’s private secured creditors received cash amounting to 
about 29 cents on the dollar. Many general unsecured creditors receive little or 
nothing while the Chrysler VEBA had many of its claims assumed by the new 
entity and received a 55% equity stake in the new firm.176 
                                                
173 Poole, supra note 129 at 23; Lasting Implications of the General Motors Bailout: Hearing Before 
the House Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight and Government Spending, 112th 
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cash from Fiat, and a promise from Chrysler to pay it $700 million per year for the next four years. 
Reuters, Fiat Reaches Deal with UAW Trust to Buy Rest of Chrysler, (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/01/us-fiat-chrysler-veba-idUSBREA000FK20140101. 
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This decision raised howls. During the years leading up to the bailouts, one of 
the main competitive disadvantages for the big three automakers was their labor 
costs. Compared with the production of transplant firms – foreign firms with 
production operations in the United States – the American labor costs were 45% 
higher.177 The incentives for the unions to bargain with other stakeholders to avoid 
failure are dramatically reduced when they are immune to the costs of the failure. 
Unions have no incentive to avoid deals that put the firm in a precarious position.178 
Critics of the bailouts also complained about their fairness. They argued that 
GM and Chrysler were chosen for bailouts because of political motivations rather 
than any assessment that bailing them out was socially optimal.179 Even supporters 
of the bailout suggest that the necessity of the bailout was questionable at the 
time.180 These general objections fold into general process criticisms against TARP 
in general. The decisions to use TARP funds were made by the executive branch 
behind closed doors without full public vetting and the motivations for those 
decisions were difficult for outside observers to assess. 
Critics also argued that the government acted unfairly by protecting the claims 
of union employees at the expense of senior creditors and other unsecured 
creditors.181 In both the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies the companies were sold in 
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“363 sales” (the bankruptcy term for the common sale or auction of assets)182 where 
the procedures essentially required any bidder to agree to the payout structure as a 
condition to participating in the auction. In a 363 sale, there are bidding procedures 
that dictate how the auction will be run and who will be allowed to participate.183 
For both GM and Chrysler, those procedures specified that to participate in the 
auction a bidder had to agree to assume specified liabilities and agree to grant the 
VEBAs the prescribed equity stake. In response to objections, the bidding 
procedures were amended to allow bids from any firm that “after consultation with 
the Creditors’ Committee, the U.S. Treasury and the UAW, [was] determined by the 
Debtors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties to be a Qualified Bidder.”184 This 
was a hollow exception. No potential outside bidder would have access to the full 
information about the assets necessary to make a firm offer to trigger a duty to be 
considered.185 No bidder requested to be excused from the procedures. 
In the Chrysler case, a dissenting member of the senior lending group objected to 
the sale process.186 The secured loans had been made through a loan syndicate. The 
relationship between the participating lenders, as is common, was governed by an 
agreement that provided for certain decisions to be made by a vote and for actions 
to be carried out by an appointed representative of the group (the administrative 
agent). An overwhelming majority of participating lenders voted in favor of 
supporting the Chrysler sale. Thus, the loan group did not object.  
The wrinkle was that that majority of participating lenders who voted in favor of 
the reorganization had also received TARP funds from Treasury. The dissenting 
creditors alleged that the government’s influence over these TARP recipients 
discouraged the latter from raising objections to the government’s plan.187 These 
objections of the dissenting creditors, however, failed to stop the sale from being 
consummated.188  
                                                
182 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 
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183 Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 182, at 49. 
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The best defense of these structures is that no other bidder existed and so the 
bidding procedures had no real effect.189 The counterargument is a procedural one: 
the entire point of having an auction is to test such claims about the market. 
Bankruptcy law places a large premium on market tests190 and procedures that 
exclude market participants defeat the purpose of the test. Because of the process 
followed, the critics argue, we will never know the answers to questions about other 
bidders.191 
A more general defense of the bankruptcy process is that the government 
intervention made no one worse off. GM and Chrysler would have collapsed without 
government intervention and the government bought these firms. Like any buyer, 
the government was free to do what it wanted with firms it bought.192 When the 
government gave the VEBA a 55% stake in Chrysler, the action had no impact on 
the rights of other creditors.  
That argument has some weight if the question is one of proper bankruptcy 
procedure. Perhaps a buyer is free to give away value to anyone it chooses.193 
Things are less clear, however, when the government intervenes in an emergency. 
The government will always be the dominant and essential creditor in a bailout 
(thus, the lender of last resort label). Bailout policy is then a question of how the 
government should exercise its power when it has that leverage as a monopolist. An 
optimal bailout policy will prevent the government from abusing its power. Through 
that lens, the complaints of political favoritism are more troubling.  
These questions bleed into the fourth area of concern: process. These bailouts 
were orchestrated by the administration under the general TARP authority, not by 
Congress. There was no legislation from Congress in favor of an auto bailout – to 
the contrary an initial auto bailout legislation proposal died in the Senate on 
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Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950). 
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December 12, 2008.194 The bailouts were negotiated in secret. While approval by the 
bankruptcy courts was necessary, the courts were confronted with a negotiated deal 
that they were reluctant to disturb in the midst of a crisis. 
Litigation after the crisis has, however, given courts an opportunity to revisit the 
government’s actions. A lawsuit against the government was brought by auto 
dealers whose agreements with Chrysler and GM were terminated in the 
bankruptcy.195 These dealers claim that the government used its leverage to force 
GM and Chrysler to terminate many of their dealership agreements. The 
termination of those agreements is unquestionably legal under the bankruptcy 
code.196 The question is whether that termination becomes an unconstitutional 
taking when the government forces the private party to take the action. The Federal 
Circuit recently held that a coerced termination that caused damage would be a 
taking.197 But the court’s language suggests that a high burden awaits plaintiffs on 
repleading: 
Absent an allegation that GM and Chrysler would have avoided bankruptcy 
but for the government’s intervention and that the franchises would have had 
value in that scenario, or that such bankruptcies would have preserved some 
value for the plaintiffs’ franchises, the terminations actually had no net 
negative economic impact on the plaintiffs because their franchises would 
have lost all value regardless of the government action.198 
This standard might block the worst forms of government abuse—for example, 
where the government used its influence over stakeholders to force the companies 
into bankruptcy and then structured the bankruptcy to favor certain parties. But it 
leaves open more subtle forms of abuse. For example, imagine that the government 
offered to finance a reorganization of the firms on the condition that certain 
stakeholders benefit at the expense of others. Even if the disfavored stakeholders 
receive a higher payout than they would have in bankruptcy, such favoritism would 
be objectionable. And, of course, the dealers’ legal theory provides courts with no 
authority to question the wisdom of the decision to bail out. 
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F. Lessons 
Many commentators believed that the bailouts rewarded risky investments, and 
depleted the public treasury without creating any benefits. Were these beliefs 
correct? To answer this question, we disaggregate the various complaints. 
1. Ex Post Efficient 
One question raised by a bailout is whether it is necessary—whether it advances 
a public goal. The usual justification for bailouts is that they create a 
macroeconomic benefit: the avoidance of the social costs associated with 
unemployment and underuse of capital. The usual complaint is that they are mere 
transfers to favored groups. Thus, a necessary (but not sufficient)  condition for a 
socially desirable bailout is a plausible pie-expanding macroeconomic benefit, or 
what we have called ex post efficiency. 
 Let us start with financial institutions, which provide a better case for bailouts 
than non-financial institutions do. Economists divide struggling financial 
institutions into two categories: solvent firms that face a liquidity crisis, and 
insolvent firms. A solvent firm faces a liquidity crisis when it cannot borrow enough 
money to fund its operations, and so must sell off assets at fire-sale prices. The 
returns on these sales may be low enough to drive the firm into insolvency. For 
more than a century, it has been basic doctrine, attributed to the British 
commentator Walter Bagehot,199 that the central bank, or other government 
institutions, should lend to solvent but illiquid firms. The additional liquidity 
enables the firm to survive while it sells off its assets gradually at their true value 
or obtains credit from the private market. Although there is disagreement on what 
the terms of such a rescue loan should be, there is little doubt that such a loan is ex 
post efficient.200 The reason is that the loan costs the government almost nothing, 
and it will be fully repaid, while the loan prevents the contagion effects of the firm’s 
collapse. If the firm’s creditors collapse as well, then they too must sell off assets at 
fire sale prices, and they and other firms will stop lending. The sudden withdrawal 
of credit from the economy has huge macroeconomic costs.201 Businesses stop 
borrowing and fire employees; consumers stop buying. 
The treatment of insolvent financial firms is more complicated. Economists 
worry that if the government bails out insolvent firms, then creditors will make 
excessively risky loans. But this is a problem with ex ante incentives, to be 
discussed below, not ex post efficiency. From an ex post perspective, the only 
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question for the government is whether the collapse of the firm will result in 
contagion that produces macroeconomic costs. If the answer is yes—which usually 
depends on the firm being large and interconnected, or “systemically risky”—then 
the government should rescue the firm, or arrange that its creditors are paid in full 
(or at least adequately). 
The case for bailing out non-financial firms is more difficult still. As a general 
matter, the collapse of a non-financial firm will not hurt the credit system, just 
because (by definition) non-financial firms are not part of the credit system. If a 
widget-manufacturer collapses, its creditors will lose money, but most creditors are 
diversified enough that their losses will not ramify throughout the financial system; 
and if they do, the usual response is to rescue the creditors, not the widget-
manufacturer. Still, some non-financial firms may be large enough that their 
collapse will produce significant macroeconomic costs. If, for example, a firm with a 
huge number of employees and suppliers collapses, the resulting macroeconomic 
shock—loss of employment and spending—could have contagious effects. The 
employees stop spending, causing other businesses to collapse; they default on their 
mortgages, causing banks to collapse; and so on. The difficulty with these types of 
bailouts is that they can be a disguised method for making transfers to favored 
interests.202 That difficulty can be seen most starkly in the 2009 auto bailouts, 
which were widely criticized as involving political favoritism.203 The lesson from all 
of this is that the more distant the firm is from the credit markets the more 
skeptical we should be of a decision to bail it out.204   
A striking fact about the 2007-2008 rescues is that nearly all of them were ex 
post efficient. Most of the rescues followed the Bagehot dictum: most of the financial 
institutions suffered liquidity shortages but were otherwise solvent. The loans to 
them were repaid in full.205 The government continues to earn returns on its Fannie 
and Freddie bailout and is likely to come out well ahead. 
However, a profitable bailout is not the same as a socially optimal bailout. Every 
bailout raises numerous choices as to how it is structured: what the rate of interest 
should be, the term, the collateral, and so on. It is appropriate to criticize even a 
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profitable bailout if it could have been structured so as to provide a greater benefit 
to the public. 
2. Fairness/Discrimination 
A second source of controversy for bailouts is that they often seem arbitrary and 
unfair. In every case study that we examined, a critic of the bailout asked why one 
firm—Lockheed or Chrysler, for example—received a bailout while thousands of 
other firms in financial distress did not. During the financial crisis in 2008, critics 
asked why Bear and AIG were saved but not Lehman, and why Wall Street firms 
were saved while most ordinary people were allowed to default on their mortgages. 
 Questions of fairness also arise about how bailouts are structured. Many 
creditors of General Motors and Chrysler believed that the government showed 
preference for union members. In a recent lawsuit, shareholders of AIG, whose 
equity was diluted by the government rescue, complained that AIG was treated 
more harshly than the other rescued firms, which were not required to disgorge 
equity to the government. Even critics of AIG wonder whether it was fair of the 
government to use AIG’s assets to pay off its counterparties in full—leading some 
commentators to accuse the government of engaging in a “backdoor” (that is, 
hidden) bailout of the counterparties, which included Goldman Sachs, among 
others.206 Indeed, critics have charged that the government showed favoritism to 
Goldman, Citigroup, and other Wall Street firms with which government officials 
had close ties.207 
3. Moral Hazard 
The major worry about bailouts is that they can produce socially undesirable 
incentives. If bailouts occur with regularity, then private agents will predict that 
they will occur whenever the conditions associated with bailouts occur. If agents can 
predict who will receive bailouts, and under what conditions, with reasonable 
accuracy, then they will change their behavior in various ways. 
The prospect of bailouts can lead to different types of bad behavior. If the market 
anticipates that, consistently with Bagehot, solvent but illiquid firms will receive 
bailouts, then creditors will not take into account the liquidity risk of borrowers—
that is, including both the liquidity of borrowers’ assets and the care with which 
management handles liquidity issues. If the market anticipates that the 
government will bail out insolvent firms, then creditors will also not concern 
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AIG COUNTERPARTIES 30 (2009), available at 
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themselves with credit risk. A derivative worry is that borrowers will maneuver 
themselves into the position in which they are likely to be rescued because this 
reduces their cost of credit. The “too-big-too-fail” problem is one manifestation of 
this concern. If everyone knows that the government will bail out only large firms, 
then creditors will reduce credit costs only for large firms. To obtain the benefit of 
lower credit costs, firms will grow beyond an efficient scale. Finally, if government 
lending is too generous, borrowers will be reluctant to switch to private lenders as 
the credit markets improve. 
Worries about moral hazard played a significant role in the government’s 
response to the financial crisis, but the government acted inconsistently. The 
government allowed Lehman to fail and imposed harsh terms on AIG at least in 
part—according to some—to counter moral hazard.208 But the government also gave 
generous terms—low interest rates—to numerous other financial institutions.209 
While some authors make a virtue of the government’s inconsistency by arguing 
that uncertainty about whether one will receive a bailout reduces moral hazard,210 
the proper method for inducing uncertainty is to randomize rather than favor the 
politically connected, who know who they are. Moreover, inconsistency will harm 
the primary goal of the government, which is to restore confidence in the financial 
system. That was the lesson of the failure of Lehman, which was unexpected 
because the government had earlier saved Bear Stearns, and precipitated the 
massive flight to liquidity that almost destroyed the financial system. 
Bagehot counsels a relatively high rate of interest to deter moral hazard, but 
central banks have generally disregarded this advice because they worry that if 
they charge high rates, borrowers will refuse to borrow, or will wait too long before 
borrowing.211 This worry might seem paradoxical since it implies that borrowers 
would voluntarily turn down loans in the middle of a liquidity crisis, when credit is 
tight. But there is a reason for this. Banks and other financial institutions worry 
that if they accept an emergency loan, the market will infer that they are insolvent 
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or on the brink of insolvency.212 So while the government may lend to them in the 
short term, they will lose access to private credit in the medium- and long-term. 
During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, banks dealt with the problem of stigma by 
refusing loans from the discount window and instead borrowing in more hidden 
ways—by seeking more depositors protected by the FDIC, borrowing from Federal 
Home Loan Banks, and relying on the Fed’s broad-based facilities.213 But all this 
suggests that the moral hazard problem is partly self-correcting and largely 
exaggerated. If firms are penalized with stigma, they will not use emergency loans 
except as a last resort, and most likely only when there is a full-blown financial 
crisis.214 And the probability of a full-blown financial crisis itself appears 
exceedingly small. There have been only two in the United States over the last 80 
years. The latest financial crisis was anticipated by no one. If the probability that 
emergency loans will be needed is exceedingly small, then the availability of such 
loans can only trivially affect the ex ante incentives of banks. 
4. Process 
Bailouts almost always take place in emergency conditions, with the result that 
they occur in a rush, with little public debate and deliberation, and often no 
transparency. This is understandable but it also raises concerns. Critics of bailouts 
worry that the government will abuse its powers in all the ways described above—
by rescuing firms that should fail, by discriminating against the politically weak, 
and by creating moral hazard problems for the future.215 Transparency may be the 
only way to mollify them and to maintain public support for the bailout process. 
During the financial crisis, it was often difficult to understand why the 
government made certain decisions—why it rescued Bear but let Lehman fail, for 
example. The official reasons were often legalistic and not credible. For example, 
officials explained that the Fed could not rescue Lehman because it lacked legal 
authority to lend to an insolvent firm,216 yet the Fed did lend (indirectly) to Bear 
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Stearns.217 In the AIG lawsuit, the plaintiffs argue that if the government really 
sought to punish AIG for its reckless conduct (as government officials have 
sometimes said), then the government should have brought legal proceedings 
against AIG, which would have occurred with due process and independently of any 
Fed loan.218 Critics complained that Paulson’s initial draft for EESA gave Treasury 
almost unlimited authority, and that the later, more precisely written draft was 
misleading. (It suggested that Treasury would buy toxic assets, when in fact 
Treasury used most of the funds to buy preferred stock in banks.) Courts played 
virtually no role in constraining the government during the crisis, and have been 
only modestly more important in adjudicating post-crisis disputes.219 
Similar complaints were leveled at the 2009 auto bailouts.220 The courts were 
involved through the bankruptcy process. But the outcome was determined through 
private negotiations. At best the judicial process ensured that the bailout plan 
designed by the White House met with technical requirements of the bankruptcy 
code.221 But the bankruptcy court had no power to review whether or not the 
government financing of the GM and Chrysler firms prior to, throughout, and after 
bankruptcy filings was an appropriate use of TARP funds. Treasury was nothing 
more than a large secured creditor that was financing the bankruptcy proceedings – 
how that came to be is not a question with which bankruptcy law is concerned. 
Additionally, the bankruptcy court permitted the sales under a process that 
foreordained the payouts to certain stakeholders, foreclosing a market test of the 
government’s claims that no alternative was available.222 
 But at the other end of the spectrum is the Lockheed bailout. There Congress 
had an open debate. And the bill almost failed. This highlights the most vexing 
concern with bailouts. The general preference is for bailouts that are efficient in a 
broad sense. But people have temporally inconsistent preferences. Ex ante the 
public may view an optimal bailout as one that is good policy taking into account 
moral hazard, fairness, and ex post efficiency. During the crisis, the public view will 
be skewed by the salience of the immediate losses, questions about whether those 
losses will be borne by certain constituencies, and by a general lack of information 
about the true risk. Ex post, their views will be skewed by hindsight and other 
biases. These problems are prevalent in all crises. Information and biases change 
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continuously.223 The shifting public and political response to the threat of Ebola in 
the fall of 2014 provides a recent example.224 
In sum, process matters. The government needs discretion when it structures 
bailouts, but it also can abuse that discretion. Procedural constraints are a tried-
and-true approach for limiting such abuse.  
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNING BAILOUTS 
Our diagnosis of the problems with bailouts suggests some principles for reform. 
We are mindful of the paradox of regulating bailouts. Because bailouts occur ex 
post, Congress can always change the rules of any statute that attempts to regulate 
them. But this paradox should not be exaggerated. First, in practice, Congress has 
delegated bailout power to regulators like the Fed and FDIC, and may be reluctant 
to revise the statutes that govern those agencies in the midst of a crisis. Second, 
even in a crisis a statute can be sticky. Congress may not want to repeal it, and if it 
doesn’t, a court may interpret Congress’ actions in light of that statute. Finally, 
even if statutory constraints are infeasible, it may be useful to state principles that 
enable the public and press to evaluate an ongoing bailout. The principles thus 
serve a political function.225 
A. Substantive Principles 
1. Ex Post Efficiency 
Financial bailouts. Virtually all bailouts of illiquid but solvent financial firms 
are ex post efficient. The reason is that the Fed can create as much liquidity as it 
wants, and it is certain to be repaid if the firm is solvent. Thus, a bailout has zero 
cost—indeed, may be profitable—for the taxpayer.226 On the benefit side, a loan to 
an illiquid firm enables it to avoid failing. While the sale of goods at fire sale prices 
is not itself an efficiency loss because the buyer gains what the seller loses, the 
collapse of a firm can produce contagion that ultimately sucks credit from the 
economy, causing macroeconomic harms. Even if it does not, the loss of 
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organizational capital is likely to be severe.227 For these reasons, bailouts of illiquid 
but solvent firms are socially desirable, all else equal. 
The case for bailing out insolvent firms is more difficult. The benefits are the 
same—the bailout reduces the risk of contagion and preserves organization capital. 
But now there are costs. A loan to an insolvent firm is really just a transfer of 
resources to the firm, and this cost must be paid by the taxpayer. (If the Fed makes 
the loan, then the cost will show up indirectly as inflation or a taxpayer bailout of 
the Fed, at least at the margin.) A further consideration is that sometimes it is not 
clear whether a firm is insolvent or merely illiquid, especially during a financial 
crisis; so there is a chance that a loan will be repaid. Moreover, a bailout of an 
insolvent firm is often just an indirect way of bailing out its creditors—which may 
be illiquid but solvent. To sum up, the case for bailing out an insolvent firm is 
weaker than the case for bailing out an illiquid but solvent firm. There should be a 
rebuttable presumption against such bailouts. 
Non-financial bailouts. The case for bailing out non-financial firms is weaker 
still. The reason is that the collapse of a non-financial firm will rarely have 
contagion effects. Non-financial institutions typically rely much less on debt than 
financial firms do; so losses are spread through thousands of equity-holders rather 
than concentrated on a smaller number of debtors. The major argument for rescuing 
non-financial firms arises when there is a systemic liquidity crisis—as occurred 
during 2007-2008—and so these firms cannot borrow even a modest amount of 
money, even when they are solvent. The bailout would be justified for purely 
macroeconomic reasons—the failure of thousands of firms would cause a recession. 
Thus, non-financial firms should be bailed out only under unusual circumstances—
when they are solvent but cannot borrow as a result of systemic collapse in the 
credit market. 
2. Moral Hazard 
The major problem caused by bailouts is that they may generate perverse 
incentives in the future. This raises the question whether a bailout should be 
structured so as to minimize those effects. As we saw, if bailouts are given out too 
freely, then creditors may disregard the credit and liquidity risk of borrowers, and 
borrowers may thus be able to engage in excessive risk. 
There are two ways to minimize this perversity. First, and most important, 
bailouts should be given out only during a systemic financial crisis—that is, a crisis 
where all or nearly all lending stops, in all areas of finance, probably at the global 
level. Financial crises of this type are probably rare enough that their effect on 
incentives will be small. The one exception is for firms that are too big to fail. If a 
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firm’s own collapse poses systemic financial risk, the moral hazard problem is more 
severe. Other remedies, such those we discuss next, are necessary in those cases. 
Second, an argument can be made that bailouts should be accompanied by 
haircuts,228 high interest rates (as advocated by Bagehot), and other penalties or 
payments for ensuring that creditors and shareholders suffer some harm. The 
prospect of such losses would further deter people from taking on excessive risk. 
However, imposing such costs may do more harm than good. If people believe that 
they will not be fully compensated, then they may hoard cash. Nevertheless, it 
seems appropriate for our principles to allow for haircuts and related measures, 
particularly when firms are viewed as too big to fail. 
These points suggest that bailouts of firms during normal economic times are 
almost always a bad idea. The government should carry a heavy burden of proof if it 
believes that a bailout is necessary to halt an incipient crisis. This is particularly 
true for non-financial firms, which typically are not systemically interconnected 
with the financial system; and small, non-interconnected financial firms. Thus, we 
advocate a strong presumption against bailouts except during a liquidity crisis that 
affects the entire financial system. The presumption should be rebuttable where the 
government can make the case that the failure of a firm would have significant 
macroeconomic consequences, but we cannot think of any event in U.S. history that 
would qualify. 
By contrast, bailouts should be presumptively available during a liquidity crisis 
for solvent firms, as Bagehot recommends. If the firms are solvent, then they cannot 
be faulted for taking on too much credit risk. It may be the case that firms have 
mismanaged liquidity. However, a true system-wide liquidity crisis will destroy 
firms that have managed liquidity wisely as well as those that have managed 
liquidity poorly. The government should not punish firms that have mismanaged 
liquidity by denying them bailouts or imposing haircuts because (1) it will be very 
difficult, during the crisis, to evaluate the quality of a firm’s liquidity management, 
and so the government would risk punishing the wrong firms; (2) punishment is 
inconsistent with the major goal of restoring confidence to creditors; and (3) there is 
no way (short of winding down a firm) to hedge against a true liquidity crisis, so it is 
doubtful that bailing out firms during a full-blown liquidity crisis will affect their 
incentives to manage liquidity during normal times. 
This leaves the category of financial firms that are insolvent during a liquidity 
crisis. Bagehot argued that the central bank should not lend to such firms, but most 
economists believe that such firms should not be allowed to collapse in a disorderly 
fashion. The FDIC takes over insolvent banks and pays off depositors (in effect, 
bailing them out) while winding down the institution. The Fed appears to have been 
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seriously hampered during the 2007-2008 crisis by the rule that it cannot lend to 
insolvent non-banks like Lehman. 
The major worry is that if insolvent institutions are rescued, creditors will make 
bad loans, knowing that the government is likely to pay them back. These loans will 
produce significant costs to the real economy—in the form of, for example, the 
construction of shopping malls that no one uses. On the other hand, if insolvent 
institutions are systemically connected, their collapse exacerbates a liquidity crisis. 
Accordingly, we suggest that there should be no presumption against lending to (or 
investing in) insolvent firms during a full-blown liquidity crisis. However, the 
government (or central bank) should be permitted to structure the loans so as to 
penalize shareholders. 
3. Fairness 
One of the most difficult problems created by bailouts is that, unavoidably, some 
people are benefited while others are not. During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
bailouts benefited the creditors and shareholders of Bear more than those of 
Lehman; the shareholders of Goldman and Morgan Stanley more than the 
shareholders of AIG; and Wall Street firms more than homeowners. It is very likely 
that numerous distributional outcomes are consistent with ex post and ex ante 
efficiency. For example, it may be the case that the government could quiet a crisis 
by bailing out firms A, B, and C, or B, C, and D, but need not bail out all four: if so, 
how should it decide? The government could also impose haircuts of various sizes on 
different creditors of the same firm. 
The danger of unfairness is particularly acute during a financial crisis. In a 
financial crisis, the government, as lender of last resort, effectively has a monopoly 
over credit. Thus, it can charge a much higher price than is justified by moral 
hazard concerns, and can discriminate in order to advance political aims. By 
contrast, during normal times, the government has no such monopoly. If a firm 
cannot obtain loans, that usually means it is insolvent, and there is no particular 
worry if the government “overcharges” the firm, since the shareholders are not 
entitled to any payoff. 
In light of this argument, we suggest a few principles. 
During financial crises, the government should set a price that reflects the 
relevant economic parameters rather than the price that maximizes the return to 
the government or taxpayers. This is simply a restatement of Bagehot’s advice that 
government should charge a price somewhat higher than what would prevail in a 
normal market. The key implication, however, is that the government may not 
charge an even higher price, even if firms are willing to pay it. Other elements of 
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Bagehot’s approach—such as the requirement that loans be fully secured—should 
also be followed. Surprisingly, they are not already clearly embodied in the law.229 
Avoid favoring politically connected firms. Many critics accused the government 
of favoring politically connected banks—above all, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. 
Hank Paulson, the Treasury Secretary during the Bush administration, was a 
former Goldman CEO, and hired numerous Goldman executives to work in the 
Treasury.230 Timothy Geithner, the NYFRB president and then Treasury Secretary, 
admitted in his memoirs that he underestimated Citigroup’s problems because his 
mentor, Robert Rubin, sat on its board.231 The public perception that the 
government favored Wall Street complicated the government’s response. The public, 
for example, wanted the government to cut the salaries of Wall Street executives, 
while the government believed that in some cases it lacked the legal authority to do 
so, and in other cases that such a move would deter banks from seeking help or 
cause the resignations of executives who were in the best position to help banks 
return to health. But while one can ask the government to be sensitive about this 
problem, it is unrealistic to propose that it refuse to bail out politically connected 
firms. All major firms are politically connected. 
Favor ordinary people, such as homeowners. Many critics of the government’s 
handling of the financial crisis who believed that the government favored Wall 
Street argued that the government should have done more for homeowners. Late in 
the crisis, the government responded by creating some programs to help bail out 
homeowners, but these had little effect, as we discussed above. We agree that, all 
else equal, it makes more sense for the government to bail out ordinary people than 
large firms. A key distinction is that ordinary people are risk-averse, while large 
firms are owned by diversified shareholders. Unfortunately, bailouts of ordinary 
people such as homeowners may be administratively infeasible. As the number of 
bailout recipients increase, the government must spend more money on 
administrative costs. These bailouts also raise other fairness questions—for 
example, why favor people who bought homes on credit over other kinds of debtors, 
like credit card debtors? 
Avoid disfavoring foreigners. A politically sensitive issue during the crisis was 
the treatment of foreign financial institutions.232 The Fed ended up bailing out 
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foreign banks as well as domestic banks because the credit market is global, not 
national. If foreigners believe they will not be rescued, and so refuse to lend to 
American institutions, then the credit crisis will not be solved. But the public had 
no sympathy for foreigners, and the Fed tried to conceal its efforts on their behalf.233 
Here, we think the Fed was correct. As a presumption, financial bailouts should not 
discriminate against foreigners. 
Is distributive neutrality possible? A kind of formal distributive neutrality is 
achievable if the government can commit itself to general eligibility standards that 
classes of firms satisfy.234 If it were to do so, it would simply announce that any firm 
that satisfied the principle described above would be entitled to a bailout. This may 
not be practical, however. One problem is that the government may be overwhelmed 
by applications for bailouts, especially during a financial crisis; another is that the 
principles are malleable enough to permit favoritism at the margin. 
Dodd-Frank permits only bailouts of groups of firms that satisfy broad-based 
eligibility requirements.235 This would limit favoritism toward individual firms. The 
crisis provides some examples of what broad-based requirements could mean. The 
Fed set up a number of facilities that extended credit to certain classes of debtors—
banks that sought to borrow against asset-backed securities, primary dealers, firms 
that rely on the commercial paper market, and so on. Broad-based requirements do 
not eliminate the risk of discrimination because the government can design the 
requirements to favor certain firms. But they do probably make favoritism toward 
individual firms a bit more difficult than it might otherwise be. 
Whether such a principle would be justified is hard to say. The benefit, as noted, 
is that it would reduce discrimination, but the reduction might be minimal. The cost 
of such a principle is that it may sometimes be the case that rescues of individual 
firms are justified. The government believed (correctly or not) that if Long Term 
Capital Management failed, it would take numerous big banks with it.236 During 
the 2007-2008 crisis, individualized loans were made to rescue Bear and AIG, and 
an individualized loan should probably have been made to save Lehman. The 
configuration of credit networks is unpredictable; broad-based eligibility 
requirements may thus interfere with needed rescues in future crises. 
4. Administrative Costs 
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A last consideration is that if the government offers bailouts too freely, it will be 
overwhelmed by applications for money. Bagehot said that the central bank should 
lend to “this man and that,” and section 13(3) allows the Fed to lend to anyone. But 
Bagehot also argued that the rate should be set high enough to deter people for 
applying for cheap loans who really did not need them. 
These are arguments for credit rationing, and they raise anew the worry that the 
central bank can use arguments about administrative costs to disguise favoritism 
toward politically connected firms. 
Worries about administrative costs might explain why Dodd-Frank requires the 
Fed to use broad-based programs with uniform eligibility requirements. On this 
approach, Fed officials do not need to weigh the benefits and costs of loans on a 
borrower-by-borrower basis, and instead can delegate to subordinates the 
mechanical process of determining whether applicants satisfy the eligibility 
requirements. As we noted above, we are skeptical that broad-based eligibility 
requirements can really constrain the Fed. While the Fed may be able to use 
administrative costs as an explanation for discriminating against some firms, such 
explanations must be evaluated carefully. 
B. Procedural Principles 
What procedural principles should govern bailouts? 
Should Congress bail out firms or should regulatory agencies do so? Generally 
speaking, a regulator should engage in bailouts for the same reason that regulators 
typically engage in executive action—they can act more quickly and flexibly than 
Congress can, and are less likely to be influenced by irrelevant political factors. The 
financial crisis provides the best illustration of this claim. The Fed and FDIC were 
able to bail out firms with great rapidity and flexibility. By contrast, when Congress 
was forced to act, it acted slowly and erratically; produced a statute that paid off 
various interest groups in order to obtain the consent of recalcitrant members of 
Congress; and in the end gave almost unlimited discretion to Treasury. 
Congressional involvement may have been necessary for political legitimacy, but if 
it had been avoidable, it should have been avoided.237 
Economists and central bankers seem largely in consensus that central banks 
should not make emergency loans to insolvent firms.238 They believe that central 
banks occupy a precarious position in a democracy because they must be given 
independence so that they can resist short-term political pressures—for example, to 
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use inflation to stimulate the economy before an election. To avoid a political 
backlash, central banks must confine themselves to the least controversial actions 
that are consistent with their mission. Loans that are paid back will create less 
political outrage than loans that are not paid back and are instead absorbed by the 
taxpayer. 
All of this might be true, but it seems to us questionable. The political backlash 
against the Fed during the last crisis took place even though the Fed did lend only 
to solvent firms. The Fed’s failure to lend to Lehman—which was thought at the 
time to be insolvent—was its greatest error. Congress punished the Fed, anyway. 
We suspect that the Fed will maintain legitimacy and independence just to the 
extent that it fulfills its mission. If it stops a financial crisis with speed and 
efficiency, it will retain its independence. This suggests that it should be given a 
broad array of tools, including the power to make loans to insolvent firms if it 
believes that the loans will help end a crisis. 
Should regulators hold hearings before bailouts? Many people complained that 
regulators acted without transparency during the financial crisis. Transparency 
would have required some kind of public process like a hearing in which interested 
parties could submit arguments for or against a proposed bailout. All things equal, 
hearings make sense because they inform the public and may provide evidence and 
arguments against bailouts that are unwise. The recipients of potential bailouts 
should be given an opportunity to propose terms, as should affected parties (such as 
creditors of the recipient). However, sometimes there will not be enough time for 
hearings, and often it may be the case that a proposed bailout must be kept secret 
until the last minute. Secrecy may be necessary to facilitate private rescues or to 
enable the government to put off a decision until one is necessary. Still, on balance 
there should be a presumption in favor of a hearing. 
Should courts play a role in bailout regulation? Judicial involvement is 
unavoidable because bailouts must obey constitutional norms and relevant state 
and federal law constraints on lending transactions and corporate investments. But 
the amount of judicial involvement is a policy choice. At one extreme, we could 
imagine that parties affected by a bailout could seek judicial review before the 
bailout is consummated. The court would approve the bailout only if it complies 
with our substantive principles, giving the appropriate deference to the factual 
determinations of the regulator. At another extreme, judicial review could be 
limited. Our view is that because of the inherent limitations of judicial review, 
courts should not be permitted to block otherwise lawful bailouts that violate the 
principles that we propose.239 
However, courts could play a more significant role after the bailout and the 
return of normal markets. In principle, courts could determine ex post if the bailout 
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complied with the principles that we have proposed. If a bailout imposed excessively 
harsh terms on a party, or was improperly denied, the affected parties might 
appropriately be entitled to a remedy. 
The role of courts in reviewing bailouts is currently being litigated. Because no 
statutory bailout framework exists, the claims are based on the Takings Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. 240 The vagueness of this clause renders it less than ideal for 
evaluating these claims. If courts decide that a judicial role in evaluating bailouts is 
appropriate under the Constitution, then the case for a statutory framework would 
be strengthened. 
For example, a statute could create a specific cause of action for challenging a 
bailout. To allow for the discretion necessary for implementing bailouts, the 
challenge would have to be after the fact and provide for damages rather than 
injunctive relief. The particular elements of the claim could be grounded in the 
substantive principles laid out above. The benefit of doing so would be to direct the 
judicial oversight to the specific areas where government actors are most likely to 
abuse their discretion. This would be more precise and targeted than litigation 
based on vague Takings claims. To cover the full scope of potential violations, 
standing would have to be expanded to include those who could pursue more 
general claims that the substantive principles have been violated.241   
On the other hand, even ex post litigation can chill the exercise of discretion in 
an emergency. The more onerous are the penalties imposed after the fact, the more 
hesitant a government actor will be to implement a bailout program. Personal 
liability for government actors, for example, would be too extreme. The benefit of 
creating damages claims against the government is that they impose a political cost 
along with providing transparency through judicial review. The key is to calibrate 
those political costs to discourage government actors from the more capricious use of 
their bailout authority while not deterring them from using that authority when 
justified. 
CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF BAILOUT REGULATION 
Dodd-Frank’s sponsors and supporters argued that the statute would make 
future bailouts unnecessary, and yet at the same time the statute continues to 
authorize the Fed to issue bailouts (albeit subject to greater restrictions than in the 
past) and gives the FDIC greater authority to make bailouts than under prior law. 
This schizophrenia has long been characteristic of bailout regulation, which does 
indeed have a paradoxical element to it. 
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The paradox is that the government wants both to commit not to make bailouts 
and to be able to make bailouts if they are necessary. The reason for committing not 
to make bailouts is that if bailouts are not available, then people will be more 
prudent with their finances, and thus financial crises may never occur. But the 
reason for making bailouts available is that even if people are prudent with their 
finances—or, if they are not but are able to exploit loopholes in order to circumvent 
regulation—then bailouts are necessary to prevent macroeconomic collapse. 
Over the years, governments have attempted to solve the paradox by 
establishing ex ante insurance programs, under which potential bailout 
beneficiaries pay in advance for their bailouts and submit to regulation that 
requires them to behave prudently. Unfortunately, insurance systems are only as 
good as predictions about the future, and the crystal ball is always hazy. The 
paradox of bailout regulation is that because the conditions under which bailouts 
are issued are unpredictable, it is impossible to set up an ex ante insurance system 
to govern all such conditions. This means that bailouts will always be necessary, 
and to some extent discretionary. 
This creates another problem. If the government enjoys discretion as to which 
firms to bail out, and how to do so, it can abuse this discretion—to reward political 
favorites (by offering them bailouts) and to punish others (by refraining from giving 
them bailouts). Thus, despite the heterogeneousness and unpredictability of the 
conditions that justify bailouts, there is value in confining the government’s 
discretion, even if only at the margins, by supplying legal or political principles for 
evaluating the work of bailout authorities. 
If our arguments are accepted, then some legal reforms would be necessary. 
Dodd-Frank’s constraints on bailouts should be eliminated, so that the Fed can 
make individualized rescues as well as bailouts based on broad-based eligibility 
rules. Congress should also either pass laws or issue non-binding statements that 
encourage regulators to bail out companies only when the negative macroeconomic 
effects of failure are significant and the moral hazard effects are limited. Procedural 
constraints should also be put into effect. Perhaps, inspectors general and other 
watchdogs can be put on the alert for political favoritism in bailout policy. 
Regulators should be required to provide guidance documents that explain how they 
plan to administer and structure bailouts should the need arise. 
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